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DELEGATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND IMPROVISATION 
Kevin Arlyck 
97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021) 
Nondelegation originalism is having its moment. Recent Supreme Court 
opinions suggest that a majority of justices may be prepared to impose strict 
constitutional limits on Congress’s power to delegate policymaking authority to 
the executive branch. In response, scholars have scoured the historical record for 
evidence affirming or refuting a more stringent version of nondelegation than 
current Supreme Court doctrine demands. Though the debate ranges widely, 
sharp disputes have arisen over whether a series of apparently broad Founding-
era delegations defeat originalist arguments in favor of a more stringent modern 
doctrine. Proponents—whom I call “nondelegationists”—argue that these 
historical delegations can all be explained as exceptions to an otherwise-strict 
constitutional limit. 
As this article shows, it is highly doubtful that the Founding generation 
thought of delegation in such categorical terms. The evidence nondelegationists 
cite in favor of their preferred classifications—systematically assessed here for 
the first time—is remarkably thin. More importantly, this article highlights how, 
for the Founding generation, building the administrative capacity needed to fulfill 
the national government’s responsibilities was not a quest to trace out hard 
constitutional boundaries between the branches. It was a dynamic and 
improvisational experiment in governance, in which Congress sought to mobilize 
the limited resources available to it in order to meet the myriad challenges the 
new nation faced. 
To recapture early delegation’s dynamism, this article focuses on the 
Remission Act of 1790. It gave the Secretary of the Treasury broad and 
unreviewable authority to remit statutory penalties for violations of federal law 
governing maritime commerce—power a strict nondelegation principle would not 
have allowed. This arrangement was not the obvious choice, and Congress 
considered vesting this power in a range of institutional actors before settling on 
the Secretary. Yet despite deep concerns over the wisdom—and even the 
constitutionality—of concentrating too much power in the hands of a single 
executive branch officer, Congress repeatedly affirmed this discretion, and the 
early Secretaries (including Alexander Hamilton) did not hesitate to use it. 
This was a pattern Congress repeated elsewhere, making early delegations 
of varying breadth across the spectrum of federal administration. This experiment 
in governance was not easy, nor was it free from controversy. Disputes over how 
and where to allocate governmental authority were frequent and contentious. But 
if legislative debates occasionally sounded in a constitutional register, 
overwhelmingly they turned on the kinds of practical considerations that 
animated Congress’s deliberations over the Remission Act. When it came to 
                                                            
 Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. For their helpful comments and 
suggestions, I thank Nicholas Bagley, Randy Barnett, Christine Chabot, Dan Ernst, Lisa 
Heinzerling, Anita Krishnakumar, Sophia Lee, Julian Mortenson, Peter Strauss, Ilan 
Wurman, and Christopher Walker. Special thanks to Nicholas Parrillo for encouraging this 
project. 
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designing a workable administrative system for the new federal government, 
delegation’s boundaries were apparently quite expansive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nondelegation originalism is having its moment. For most of 
the past century, the Supreme Court has been highly reluctant to 
impose any meaningful constitutional limit on Congress’s ability to 
delegate rulemaking authority to the executive branch. Yet recent 
Court opinions suggest that five justices might be ready to adopt a 
more stringent view of the nondelegation doctrine, on originalist 
grounds. Most notably, in Gundy v. United States,1 Justice Gorsuch 
argued in dissent that the Court’s longstanding approach to 
                                                            
1 139 S.Ct.  2116 (2019). 
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nondelegation—which requires only that Congress provide the 
executive with an “intelligible principle” to guide administrative 
rulemaking2—“has no basis in the original meaning of the 
Constitution.”3 According to Gorsuch, “the framers” believed that 
Congress could not delegate to the executive branch “the power to 
adopt generally applicable rules of conduct governing future actions 
by private persons.”4 Given the apparent agreement of four other 
justices,5 Gorsuch’s opinion raises the possibility that the Court will 
soon impose significant limits on Congress’s ability to delegate 
authority to administrative agencies. Though the full scope and 
implications of such a decision are far from clear,6 a reinvigorated 
nondelegation doctrine could have a significant impact on how the 
modern administrative state functions.7 
Given the potential stakes, both skeptics and supporters of the 
administrative state have recently explored in detail what people in 
the Founding era thought about Congress’s power to delegate 
legislative authority to the executive.8 Though the scholarly debate 
ranges broadly over a variety of pre-Ratification European and 
                                                            
2 J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 410 (1928). 
3 Gundy, 139 S.Ct.  at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
4 Id. at 2133. 
5 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined Justice Gorsuch’s dissent. Id. at 2131. 
In the same case, Justice Alito said he would be “willing to reconsider” the permissive 
approach mandated by the Court’s precedent. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Justice Kavanaugh has since suggested that Justice Gorsuch’s “thoughtful” opinion in 
Gundy merited “further consideration.” Paul v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 342 (Mem) (Nov. 
25, 2019) (statement of Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
6 See Andrew Coan, Eight Futures of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 141 
(2020) (discussing “six possible scenarios” for the Court’s future nondelegation 
jurisprudence). 
7 See Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. 
L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021), at 19 (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine could become a 
genuine limit on Congress’s power to enlist agencies in the task of governance.”); Nicholas 
R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative 
Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 
1790s, 130 YALE L. J. ___ (forthcoming 2021), at 6; (“[R]ulemaking is so ubiquitous that 
mere doubt about its constitutionality could work major changes in the nondelegation 
doctrine and administrative law more generally.”). 
8 See Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History of Delegation at the Founding, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3654564; Aaron Gordon, 
Nondelegation, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 718 (2019); Philip Hamburger, Delegating or 
Divesting?, Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy (2020), https://scholarlycommons.law. 
northwestern.edu/nulr_online/293; Gary Lawson, Mr. Gorsuch, Meet Mr. Marshall: A 
Private-Law Framework for the Public-Law Puzzle of Subdelegation, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3607159; Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __; Parrillo, Critical 
Assessment, supra note __; Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L. J. 
___ (forthcoming 2021). 
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American sources,9 some of the sharpest disputes have arisen over 
the conclusions one can draw from early federal legislation. 
Throughout the 1790s (and well into the 19th century), Congress 
passed laws giving the executive branch significant policymaking 
discretion in a variety of domains—patents, foreign trade, military 
pensions, land taxation, and the postal system, to name a few.10  
Delegation’s modern supporters view these Founding-era 
statutes as powerful evidence that nondelegation principles imposed 
a weak limit on the early Congress’s power to delegate—and 
perhaps no limit at all.11 Proponents of a more demanding 
doctrine—whom I call “nondelegationists”—argue that such 
examples constituted permissible “exceptions” to an otherwise-
strict limit, or that they were not delegations of legislative authority 
in the first place.12 In the background of these disputes is a tacit 
acknowledgment that examination of early federal legislation may 
be the best way—perhaps the only way—to figure out whether the 
Constitution as originally understood included a nondelegation 
principle more stringent than the permissive one enshrined in 
modern Supreme Court doctrine.13 
As a historical matter, however, the recent scholarly 
efflorescence risks obscuring as much as it reveals. Much of the 
                                                            
9 See, e.g., PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); Mortenson 
& Bagley, supra note __, at 22-76; Wurman, supra note __ , at 24-43. 
10 See generally Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 76-118. 
11 See Chabot, supra note __, at 3 (“[T]he theory and practice of delegation in the Founding 
era never reflected a particularly high constitutional bar.”); Mortenson & Bagley, supra 
note __, at 76 (“[T]he founders’ practice reflected their theory: regulatory delegations were 
limited only by the will and judgment of the legislature.”); Parrillo, Critical Assessment, 
supra note __, at 17 (“Vesting power in administrators to make sweeping discretionary 
decisions with high political stakes was not alien to the federal lawmakers who first put the 
Constitution into practice.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1735 (2002) ([C]onsistent early 
practice … decisively established the permissibility of statutory grants to the president 
unchecked by any apparent intelligible principle.”). 
12 See Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern 
Administrative State, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUBLIC POLICY 147, 157 (2017) (“Outside the realm 
of foreign affairs … [Congress] did not authorize the President …to adopt rules that 
broadly regulated behavior of private individuals or entities ….”); Gordon, supra note __, 
750 (asserting that “a few exceptions” to early nondelegation practice “do not reflect a view 
among the framing generation that no such prohibition existed”); Gary Lawson, Delegation 
and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398-402 (2002) (arguing that six early 
examples did not “clearly vest legislative power in executive or judicial actors”); Wurman, 
supra note __, at 6. (“Most of this legislation … from early Congresses is consistent with 
modern scholarly accounts of nondelegation.”).  
13 See Parrillo, Critical Assessment, supra note __, at 7-8 (“[S]ources on original meaning 
besides early congressional acts—constitutional text, pre-ratification discourse, and 
structure—say very little about constitutional limits on delegation.”). 
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current literature tries to marshal the available evidence into a 
complete theory of nondelegation that accounts for all the legislation 
the early Congress actually passed. Nondelegationists, in particular, 
advance a number of different exceptional categories of delegation 
that they claim were originally understood to be permissible under 
the Constitution: delegations of “nonexclusive” legislative authority 
shared by the executive14; delegations regarding “foreign affairs”15 
or public “benefits”16; delegations of authority to “fill up the details” 
on matters of lesser importance17; delegations out of “necessity.”18 
These classifications’ historical accuracy is underexplored in 
the current scholarship, yet deeply important. Without such 
exceptions, it is difficult—if not impossible—for nondelegationists 
to reconcile a number of early congressional delegations with a 
stringent original understanding of nondelegation principles.19 
Whether the justifications are based on foreign affairs, benefits, lack 
of importance, or some other category, they are essential to the   
nondelegationist effort to explain the early Congress’s apparent 
willingness to give significant policymaking discretion to the 
executive branch. 
As this article shows, it is highly doubtful that the Founding 
generation thought of delegation and its limits in such categorical 
terms. The historical evidence nondelegationists cite in favor of their 
preferred taxonomies—systematically assessed here for the first 
time—is remarkably thin.20 Simply put, no one at the Founding did 
                                                            
14 See Wurman, supra note __, at 38-43. 
15 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct.  at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Cass, supra note __, at 157-58; 
Gordon, supra note __, at 782-83. 
16 See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 3 n.(b), 86-87; Aditya Bamzai, 
Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of 
Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 178-82 (2019). 
17 See Lawson, Private-Law Framework, supra note __, at 4; Wurman, supra note __, at 7. 
18 See Lawson Private-Law Framework, supra note __, at 35-37; cf. also Chabot, supra 
note __, at 41-44 (suggesting a “necessity” theory might best explain early delegations). 
19 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 119-20; Parrillo, Critical Assessment, supra 
note __, at 9-10. 
20 See infra Part III.B. In their forthcoming article, Julian Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley 
generally deny that such exceptions existed at the Founding, but do not directly address the 
arguments put forth by nondelegationists. See Mortenson and Bagley, supra note __, at 4, 
119-20. In an unpublished supplement to his forthcoming article, Nicholas Parrillo 
suggests that two exceptions—foreign affairs and privileges/benefits—may be 
“untenable,” but he does not evaluate all the evidence cited by nondelegationists, and 
ultimately assumes the exceptions’ validity for purposes of argument. See Nicholas R. 
Parrillo, Supplemental Paper to: “A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against 
Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real 
Estate in the 1790s”, at 19-20, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3696902. A recent Note explores several early delegations specifically in the realm of 
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more than hint at the existence of such categories (and they barely 
even did that). If that is true, the originalist argument in favor of 
stricter constitutional limits on delegation seems to be defeated by 
the historical evidence. 
The search for a restrictive original nondelegation doctrine also 
poses a deeper problem: It loses sight of the highly uncertain and 
improvisational nature of early American statebuilding. As this 
article illustrates, for members of the early Congress, building the 
administrative capacity needed to fulfill the new national 
government’s critical responsibilities was not a quest to trace out 
hard constitutional boundaries between the branches.21 It was a 
dynamic, improvisational, and only partially successful experiment 
in governance, in which Congress sought to mobilize the limited 
resources available to it in order to meet the myriad challenges the 
nation faced. Whatever abstract limits the Constitution might have 
imposed on Congress’s ability to allocate policymaking authority 
across the institutions of the nascent federal government, when it 
came to actually legislating they had little apparent effect. 
To recapture early delegation’s uncertainty and dynamism, this 
article explores the phenomenon through the lens of the Remission 
Act of 1790.22 The Act was the First Congress’s most intriguing 
grant of legislative authority to the executive branch, yet is has 
largely been ignored in the nondelegation literature.23 In it, Congress 
gave the Secretary of the Treasury a power to “regulat[e] private 
conduct” that modern nondelegationists would likely deem 
constitutionally impermissible.24 Under the Act, the Secretary could 
waive entirely the statutory penalties imposed for violations of 
major federal laws governing customs collection and maritime 
                                                            
foreign affairs, and concludes that “[n]o one suggested the[y] were permissible solely by 
virtue of their foreign affairs subject matter.” Note, Nondelegation’s Unprincipled Foreign 
Affairs Exceptionalism, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1132, 1140 (2020). 
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 See Remission Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 122. 
23 See Gordon, supra note __, at 793 (three sentences); Lawson, Original Meaning, supra 
note __, at 401 (two paragraphs); Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 86 (three 
sentences); Posner & Vermeule, supra note __, at 1735 (one sentence); Wurman, supra 
note __, at 38 (two sentences). This scholarly inattention is understandable. Congress 
established the Act in a one-paragraph statute, 1 Stat. 122, and the early Supreme Court 
only discussed it once, see, e.g., United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 291 
(1825). As a result, the importance of the early Treasury Secretaries’ remission authority 
only becomes apparent through archival research into how they actually used the power, 
something I have done in prior work. See Kevin Arlyck, The Founders’ Forfeiture, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1482-98 (2019). 
24 Gundy, 139 S.Ct.  at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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commerce.25 As long as the Secretary believed that the lawbreaker 
had acted without “intention of fraud,” he could impose as much or 
as little of the attendant fine or forfeiture as he “deem[ed] reasonable 
and just.”26 There was no appeal from the Secretary’s decision—not 
to the courts, not to the President, and not to Congress.27 In short, 
shortly after the Constitution was ratified, Congress did what Justice 
Gorsuch (and others) believe is constitutionally forbidden: It 
delegated to the executive branch Congress’s own authority to 
determine what financial punishments the government would 
impose on private individuals for violations of the law.28 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, agreement on how best to structure 
such a significant grant of discretion did not come easily. Remission 
of penalties was inherently a legislative power, exercised by 
Congress in the first instance.29 But at Alexander Hamilton’s 
suggestion, Congress resolved to delegate that power elsewhere. 
Fueled by deep concerns over the wisdom of concentrating too much 
power in the hands of a single person, the legislature considered 
vesting its remission authority in a bewildering array of institutional 
actors—local federal officials, district court judges, a panel of 
cabinet officers, and the even the justices of the Supreme Court—
before settling on the Treasury Secretary.30 Reluctant to commit to 
this arrangement, Congress repeatedly reauthorized the Act on a 
temporary basis, and it was subject to renewed challenge—
including on nondelegation grounds—before finally becoming 
permanent in 1800.31 
As contested as the Act was, members of Congress did not think 
that the Constitution had much to say about it. To the contrary, they 
largely debated the Act on the basis of nonconstitutional values—
efficiency, consistency, expertise, neutrality, capacity—which often 
cut in different directions. They argued over how best to balance the 
government’s law enforcement priorities against the obligation to 
treat citizens with justice. In so doing, they apparently felt free to 
experiment with various institutional arrangements, to come up with 
                                                            
25 See Arlyck, supra note __, at 1482-98. 
26 See Remission Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 122. 
27 Arlyck, supra note __, at 1485 & n.215 (2019). 
28 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting) (“[I]t’s hard to see how giving the 
nation’s chief prosecutor the power to write a criminal code rife with his own policy 
choices might be [constitutionally] permissible.”); see also infra Part II.D. 
29 See infra Part II.B. 
30 Id. 
31 See infra Part II.C. 
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solutions to the challenges of national governance that best balanced 
the competing considerations at play.32 
As this article explains, this was a pattern Congress repeated in 
other areas, making delegations of varying breadth to a range of 
government officials, across the spectrum of federal administration. 
In areas as diverse as revenue collection, disaster relief, and military 
development (among others), Founding-generation Americans 
displayed tremendous creativity in building a federal government 
that would be limited in its objects but vigorous in pursuing them.33  
This “extended improvisation” in governance was not easy, nor 
was it free from controversy.34 Disputes over how and where to 
allocate governmental authority were frequent and contentious. And 
debaters occasionally advanced nondelegation arguments, rendering 
it at least plausible that Founding-era constitutional understandings 
included some theoretical limit on Congress’s ability to delegate its 
authority to the executive branch.35 But whatever nondelegation 
principles such interlocutors may have had in mind, there is little 
evidence that they imposed anything more than a weak constraint on 
Congress’s discretion. When it came to the nitty-gritty of designing 
a workable administrative system for the new federal government, 
delegation’s boundaries were expansive indeed. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the current 
debate over whether the modern, permissive nondelegation doctrine 
is consistent with an originalist interpretation of the Constitution. 
The Part focuses particular attention on the various ways in which 
nondelegationist scholars have sought to reconcile the best evidence 
of the Constitution’s original meaning—early federal statutes—with 
a stringent view of constitutional limits on delegation. 
Part II describes the Remission Act’s origins, revealing the 
challenge Congress faced in designing a system for remitting 
statutory penalties that would balance protection of federal revenue 
against lenity for unintentional lawbreakers. In light of deep 
concerns about the wisdom of concentrating legislative power in a 
single executive-branch official, Congress considered a number of 
different options before ultimately conferring broad and 
                                                            
32 See infra Part IV.A. 
33 See infra Part IV.B. 
34 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Founders’ Foreign Affairs Constitution: Improvising Among 
Empires, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 209, 213 (2008). 
35 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 6 (“A smattering of comments by a handful 
of commentators did very occasionally suggest that legislatures might not be able to 
irrevocably alienate their power to make laws.”). 
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unreviewable authority on the Treasury Secretary. Despite ongoing 
objections to this arrangement, Congress repeatedly reauthorized the 
Act throughout the 1790s, and the early Treasury Secretaries—
including Alexander Hamilton—did not hesitate to use their power 
to waive statutory penalties set by Congress. 
In light of this history, Part III uses the Remission Act as a 
vehicle for assessing the various theories advanced by 
nondelegationists to reconcile early legislation with a stringent 
version of the doctrine. The Part first concludes that the Act itself 
cannot be explained satisfactorily by any of the theories. Even if 
remission might resemble an exercise of traditional executive 
authority (such as prosecutorial discretion or pardon), or can be seen 
as relating to foreign affairs or the provision of public benefits, the 
Act does not fit easily into any proposed exceptional category. 
In so doing, Part III also answers a broader—and more 
important—question: Are these “exceptions” historically accurate? 
By carefully considering the limited evidence cited by proponents, 
and the significant evidence against, Part III concludes that such 
categorical conceptions of nondelegation almost certainly did not 
exist. As a result, there are a number of early delegations by 
Congress, in addition to the Remission Act, that can only be 
explained by the conclusion that there was not much of a 
nondelegation doctrine at the Founding at all. 
Part IV steps back, to consider how and why the early 
Congresses granted such power to the Treasury Secretary in the first 
place. In struggling to design an administrative system for 
commercial regulation and revenue collection, Congress considered 
a variety of arrangements that might strike the right balance between 
several different administrative values. Delegation to the Treasury 
Secretary was not the obvious choice—it was simply the best one 
Congress could come up with. As this Part shows, the same was true 
in other areas, offering a new perspective on familiar Founding-era 
episodes in the nondelegation scholarship. Across the domains of 
federal administration, strict constitutional limits on what powers 
and responsibilities the legislature could delegate to another branch 
were not what shaped the early regime. 
I. THE NONDELEGATION DEBATE 
For nearly all of its history in the Supreme Court, nondelegation 
has operated as a famously weak limit on Congress’s ability to 
10 
delegate legislative authority to the executive branch.36 The Court 
has only ruled three times that a statute was an unconstitutional 
delegation, all in the New Deal era.37 It has repeatedly upheld very 
broad delegations in the face of constitutional challenge.38 Given 
this history, more than one commentator has declared the 
nondelegation doctrine effectively to be a dead letter.39 
Recently, nondelegation has experienced a revival. Building on 
a strand of legal scholarship insisting that the Supreme Court’s 
“intelligible principle” test is incompatible with Founding-era views 
about the delegation of legislative authority,40 a majority of the 
current Court may be prepared to adopt a more stringent version of 
the doctrine. Without a doubt, the view recently articulated by 
Justice Gorsuch in Gundy would represent a significant change in 
approach. According to Justice Gorsuch, Congress cannot give the 
President or an agency the discretion to “adopt generally applicable 
rules of conduct governing future actions by private persons”41—
which it has done in many statutes, including several upheld by the 
Court in the past.42 As a number of commentators have noted, the 
Supreme Court’s adoption of this test would call into question the 
constitutionality of major delegations of legislative authority.43 
Even assuming the Court would hesitate before striking down 
                                                            
36 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (“We 
might say that the conventional doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and 
counting).”). 
37 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 
(1936). 
38 See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) 
(“public interest, convenience, or necessity”); Whitman v. American Trucking 
Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“requisite to protect the public health” with “an 
adequate margin of safety”). 
39 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL Review 
132-33 (1980); Posner & Vermeule, supra note __, at 1722. 
40 See Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note __; HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __; 
Cass Delegation, supra note __; Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation 
Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its 
Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TULANE L. REV. 265 (2001). 
41 Gundy, 139 S.Ct.  at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The rules articulated by Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch are not identical, but they are substantively similar. Dept. of 
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 70 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (Congress cannot delegate authority to “formulate generally 
applicable rules of private conduct”).  
42 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1989) (citing examples). 
43 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion) (asserting that if SORNA is 
unconstitutional, “then most of Government is unconstitutional”); Mortenson & Bagley, 
supra note __, at 18-20. 
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important federal legislation on nondelegation grounds,44 a more 
demanding doctrine could have significant repercussions for the 
administrative state more generally.45 
Justice Gorsuch justified his test based on what he understands 
to be the Constitution’s “original meaning”46 and the “guiding 
principles” left to us by “the framers.”47 Yet the historical evidence 
he cites in Gundy does little to support his proposed version of 
nondelegation. His opinion includes several references to the 
Federalist, a quotation from John Locke, and citation to three early 
nineteenth-century cases. Justice Thomas’s precursor opinion in 
Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads 
relies more heavily on citations to pre-revolutionary English 
precedent (stretching back to Magna Carta), and a sprinkling of 
Founding-era sources (mostly from the Federalist).48 At best, these 
materials suggest that nondelegation is consistent with separation of 
powers principles more generally.49 None of them articulate 
anything like the test the Justices purport to derive from the 
historical record.50 
That said, Justice Gorsuch also cited a handful of scholars who 
argue that the Court’s twentieth-century nondelegation doctrine is 
incompatible with Founding-era views.51 In Gundy’s wake, these 
skeptics have been joined by several more.52 In response, several 
defenders of the modern doctrine have engaged in their own deep 
investigations into Founding-era sources.53 The collective result is a 
                                                            
44 See Coan, supra note __, at 142 (“A sweeping revolution in U.S. constitutional law is 
unlikely to be imminent.”). 
45 See Bamzai, supra note __, at 169 (suggesting that, following Gundy, the Court may read 
delegating statutes more narrowly to avoid a constitutional difficulty). 
46 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
47 Id. at 2135-36. 
48 575 U.S. 43, 69-76 (2015). 
49 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct.  at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“‘[T]here can be no liberty 
where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of 
magistrates.’” (quoting The Federalist No. 47, (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), at 302 (Madison))). 
50 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 22 (“[T]he only actual quotes from historical 
sources [in Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy opinion] either speak generally to the undesirability 
of vesting all constitutional powers in one body or recite the familiar reasons that the 
Constitution makes legislating hard.”); see generally Parrillo, Supplemental, supra note __, 
at 3-13. 
51 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2135-40 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing, e.g., Cass, supra note 
__, at 153; HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 378; Lawson, Original Meaning, 
supra note __, at 340) 
52 See supra note __. 
53 See supra note __. 
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far richer exploration of the historical evidence than found in recent 
Supreme Court opinions. 
The challenge for originalist analysis of nondelegation is that 
the usual sources of evidence—text, structure, and pre-ratification 
discourse—are largely unhelpful in identifying the doctrine’s 
precise contours.54 As conceded on all sides, the constitutional text 
itself tells us virtually nothing.55 Article I says that “[a]ll legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States,” but does not say anything about whether Congress can 
delegate those powers to non-legislative actors.56 Arguments from 
constitutional structure do not get us much further. A stringent view 
of nondelegation might be consistent with a tripartite division of 
governmental authority57 (or with other features of American 
constitutionalism, like federalism58). But even proponents of a 
structural basis for nondelegation concede that such an approach 
provides little clarity as to how the doctrine might apply in 
practice.59 Finally, pre-ratification discourse suffers from similar 
flaws. While scholars on both sides of the debate cite extensively to 
statements made by British and American legal and political 
thinkers in the 17th and 18th centuries, the most such sources can 
tell us is that there was some limit on the legislature’s power to give 
                                                            
54 See Parrillo, Supplemental Paper, supra note __, at 3-13. 
55 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2127 (2004); Lawson, Original Meaning, 
supra note __, at 335. 
56 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1. Even if a limit on delegation could be implied, cf. Hamburger 
Divesting 1 (“The Constitution vests legislative powers in Congress, and that body 
therefore cannot divest itself of the power that the Constitution vests in it.”), the text offers 
no indication of what delegations that limit might permit or prohibit, see Parrillo, 
Supplemental Paper, supra note __, at 4 n.7.  
57 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2133-37 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Gary Lawson, Discretion and 
Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 235 (2005) Rappaport, supra note __, at 305-10. But see Mortenson & Bagley, 
supra note __, at 21-59 (original understandings of legislative and executive power do not 
imply any limit on delegation except permanent alienation of legislative power). 
58 See Jennifer Mascott, Early Customs Laws and Delegation, 87 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1388 
(2020). 
59 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note __, at 78 (conceding his structure-derived test is “vague 
and difficult to apply”). But cf. Lawson, Private-Law Framework, supra note __, at 7-8 
(arguing that a prohibition on delegations involving “important subjects” is implicit in the 
Constitution’s nature as a fiduciary instrument governed by agency law principles). 
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away rulemaking authority.60 They do not offer standards for 
assessing the constitutionality of particular delegations.61 
The lack of specificity in much of the historical evidence 
presents a significant problem. As everyone from James Madison,62 
to John Marshall,63 to Antonin Scalia64 has recognized, what 
bedevils the nondelegation doctrine is the difficulty of formulating 
a test that consistently and predictably distinguishes permissible 
delegations from impermissible ones.65 Indeed, the difficulty of this 
line-drawing exercise is one of the reasons the Supreme Court 
adopted the “intelligible principle” test in the first place.66 
The difficulty of deriving a workable rule from text, structure, 
and pre-Ratification discourse is—or at least should be—a particular 
concern for nondelegationists. After all, they want to overrule the 
Court’s precedent, and replace the “intelligible principle” test with 
a more demanding one.67 As a result, they bear the burden of proving 
that the Court’s longstanding approach to nondelegation 
contravenes the Constitution’s original meaning. How heavy a 
                                                            
60 The fact that the same sources can lead scholars to profoundly different conclusions 
highlights the indeterminacy of the principles such sources supposedly express. Compare 
Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2133-3 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND 
TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION), with 
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 31-34 (same). 
61 In addition, as Nicholas Parrillo points out, pre-revolutionary English sources on the 
limits of legislative authority may be of questionable value in interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution, given the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy over the English 
constitution. Parrillo, Supplemental Paper, supra note __, at 5-6; see also Hamburger, 
Divesting, supra note __, at 3 (critiquing Mortenson and Bagley for “quot[ing] mostly 
Europeans”).  
62 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 238-39 (1791) (Madison) (conceding the difficulty of 
“determin[ing] with precision the exact boundaries of the legislative and executive 
powers”). 
63 See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 46 (1825) (the “precise boundary of” the 
legislature’s authority to “commit something to the discretion of the other departments” 
was “a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter 
unnecessarily”). 
64 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 414 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (because 
“no statute can be entirely precise … the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes 
a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of degree”). 
65 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he exact line between policy 
and details, lawmaking and fact-finding, and legislative and non-legislative functions ha[s] 
sometimes invited reasonable debate …”). 
66 See Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (“[W]e 
have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree 
of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.”). 
67 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Th[e] … “intelligible principle” 
remark has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution ….”). 
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burden is subject to debate,68 but, as the Court recently indicated, at 
minimum stare decisis requires “something more than ambiguous 
historical evidence” before the Court will “flatly overrule … major 
decisions.”69 
Given the indeterminacy of text, structure, and pre-ratification 
discourse, scholars have devoted significant attention to post-
ratification events—in particular, the passage (or defeat) of 
legislation delegating rulemaking authority to the executive 
branch.70 This evidence has two significant advantages.71 First, it 
offers actual examples of delegations the early Congresses made to 
the executive branch, which can help us understand more precisely 
which kinds of delegations were understood to be constitutionally 
permissible.72 Second, examining the output of a representative 
legislature reduces the danger of relying on statements made by 
individuals, which may represent idiosyncratic views.73 In addition, 
delegations that gained support across political divides and endured 
through time—like the Remission Act74—are unlikely to be 
aberrational. Instead, they are likely the most reliable evidence we 
have of what limits—if any—the Founding generation thought the 
Constitution imposes on delegations of legislative power. 
The difficulty for nondelegationists is that Congress’s early 
practice is not in their favor. For starters, there is little affirmative 
evidence in favor of a more stringent test for nondelegation than the 
Court’s current “intelligible principle” formulation. By my count, 
nondelegationists point to only four examples of Congress rejecting 
a Founding-era legislative proposal on nondelegation grounds. As I 
explain later in this article (for the first time in the literature), it is 
doubtful whether nondelegation concerns shaped three of the 
enactments at all.75 Nondelegation was more clearly at issue in the 
fourth episode, which involved a well-studied 1792 statute 
                                                            
68 Whether the principle of stare decisis is compatible with an originalist theory of 
constitutional interpretation is the subject of much scholarly debate. In particular, 
commentators diverge on when—if ever—a precedent that is wrong on originalist grounds 
can nonetheless be left intact. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1922 (2017). 
69 Gamble v. United States, 139 S.Ct.  1960, 1969 (2019). 
70 See supra notes __ to __.  
71 See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles 
as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENTARY 371, 378-79 (2007). 
72 See Parrillo, Supplemental Paper, supra note __, at 11-12. 
73 Posner & Vermeule, supra note __, at 1737.  
74 See infra Part II.C. 
75 See infra notes __ to __ and accompanying text (1793 Patent Act); infra note __ (1809 
and 1810 embargo acts).  
15 
establishing the federal postal system. But the evidence from that 
episode is contradictory at best.76 Of course, it is possible that a 
stringent view of nondelegation influenced the early Congress in 
unspoken ways—by influencing members’ votes, or dissuading 
them from proposing broad delegations in the first place. Such 
possibilities, however, are not actual evidence of a robust Founding-
era doctrine.77 
The greater problem for nondelegationists is that there is 
affirmative evidence supporting an expansive Founding-era view of 
delegation. As a recent scholarship has shown, throughout the early 
period Congress repeatedly gave the executive branch broad 
authority to fashion rules governing private conduct.78 Though the 
Remission Act is largely overlooked in this literature, it is a 
compelling example.79 
Nondelegationists respond to this evidence by asserting that 
certain kinds of delegations were permissible at the Founding, even 
if the Constitution generally barred Congress from giving legislative 
authority to the executive.80 Justice Gorsuch, for example, believes 
there were several caveats to the general prohibition on delegation. 
Congress could authorize another branch to “fill up the details” of a 
statutory scheme, as long as it first made “the policy 
decisions … regulating private conduct.”81 Scholars have echoed 
that view, arguing that Congress could not delegate rulemaking 
authority over “important” matters, but could with respect to less-
                                                            
76 See infra notes __ to __ and accompanying text. 
77 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 22 (“The original public meaning of 
constitutional text … can’t be a secret or hidden meaning.”) 
78 Mortenson and Bagley document this phenomenon in detail. Mortenson & Bagley, supra 
note __, at 68-88, 99-111; see also Parrillo, Supplemental Paper, supra note __, at 13-16 
(listing examples); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: 
THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (2012) . 
79 See supra Part II.D. 
80 In addition to the exceptions discussed here, Justices Gorsuch and Thomas suggest that 
Congress can make application of a rule governing private conduct depend on executive 
fact-finding. See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); American Railroads, 
575 U.S. at 79 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The classic example is “contingent 
legislation”—a statute that goes into effect on the occurrence of a particular event, the 
identification of which is a “factual” question permissibly left to the executive branch. See 
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892) (“[T]he president was … the mere 
agent of [Congress] to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was 
to take effect.”). As even nondelegationists concede, successfully applying such a 
distinction depends “on the clarity of the line between fact and law, and that is decidedly 
not a clear line.” Gary Lawson, I’m Leavin’ It (All) Up to You: Gundy and the (Sort-of) 
Resurrection of the Subdelegation Doctrine, CATO S. CT. REV. 31, 66-67 (2019). 
81 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
16 
important “details.”82 In Gundy Justice Gorsuch also invoked an 
exception allowing delegation when the power in question 
“overlaps” with authority the Constitution vests in another branch—
for example, with respect to foreign affairs83 (another category 
echoed by commentators84). Several scholars have also suggested 
that Congress could originally delegate authority to regulate the 
provision of public benefits, if not private rights85—a position 
Justice Thomas seems to endorse.86 Finally, several scholars have 
suggested (at least implicitly) that Congress historically could 
delegate authority to the executive branch when it was 
“necessary”—i.e., when the task delegated was one Congress 
simply could not perform itself.87 
These exceptions are profoundly important for the 
nondelegationist position. As I explain in more detail in Part III, 
without them originalist proponents of a more stringent version of 
the doctrine have difficulty explaining a number of broad 
delegations made by the Congress.88 To be sure, even taken at face 
value these exceptions may not sufficiently explain all instances in 
which Congress granted legislative authority to the executive, as 
there are Founding-era delegations—including the Remission Act 
itself89—that do not fit easily into any exceptional category.90  
                                                            
82 See Lawson, Private-Law Framework, supra note __, at 7-8; Wurman, supra note __, at 
11. 
83 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
84 See Gordon, supra note __, at 782; Rappaport, supra note __, at 352-54; Wurman, supra 
note __, at 48-49. 
85 See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 3 n.b, 85-87; Bamzai, supra note __, at 
182 (“A distinction between rights and privileges might explain several laws enacted in 
early Congresses that delegated authority to the executive branch ….”); Wurman, supra 
note __, at 52 (“Perhaps Congress had more power to delegate authority to establish public 
privileges.”) 
86 American Railroads, 575 U.S. at 83 & n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
87 See Chabot, supra note __, 40-43; Lawson Private-Law Framework, supra note __, at 
35-37; Wurman 47-48, 49, 50. 
88 See Hamburger Divesting 15 (delegation defenders “do[] not point to any instance when 
the Executive, with or without congressional authorization, made binding rules or 
adjudications that were national and domestic in their scope”); Aaron Gordon, A Rebuttal 
to “Delegation at the Founding,” at 32, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561062 (“[E]very 
enactment [delegation defenders] discuss either falls into one of the well-established 
‘exceptions’ to the principle of nondelegation or is obviously not a delegation of legislative 
power at all.”); Wurman 44-58 (describing several early delegations as addressing subjects 
that were not “important”). 
89 See infra Part III. 
90 See, e.g., Parrillo, Critical Assessment, supra note __, at 10 (arguing that a 1798 land tax 
does not fall into either the foreign affairs or privileges exceptions). 
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More importantly, it is highly doubtful whether these 
exceptions actually existed at the Founding. As I further explore in 
Part III, there is virtually no evidence in their favor, and meaningful 
evidence against.91 If that analysis is correct, the originalist 
argument in favor of a more stringent nondelegation doctrine seems 
to be significantly flawed, as it cannot account for a number of broad 
delegations of legislative authority at the Founding. But before 
assessing the historical viability of these categories more generally, 
the following Part sets the stage by detailing what arguably was the 
First Congress’s most significant delegation—the Remission Act of 
1790. 
II. DELEGATING THE REMISSION POWER 
For such a statute granting such important power, the 
Remission Act’s origins were innocuous enough. On January 19, 
1790, Alexander Hamilton sent a letter to the House of 
Representatives. His ostensible purpose was to report on the petition 
of Christopher Saddler, an American mariner seeking relief from a 
fine imposed for his noncompliance with customs regulations 
Congress had enacted six months earlier. The House committee 
charged with responding to Saddler’s petition referred it to Hamilton 
for a recommendation. In his brief report, Hamilton had little to say 
about Saddler himself. Though Hamilton thought that relief was 
likely justified, he wanted more information about the case before 
making a formal recommendation.92 
Hamilton did not stop there, however. Instead, “avail[ing] 
himself of the occasion” the petition presented, Hamilton urged the 
House to develop a comprehensive solution to the problem of 
unintentional customs violations. As Hamilton explained, there 
were many cases in which “considerable forfeitures” had been 
incurred by persons who had unintentionally broken the law. In his 
view, this state of affairs made it a “necessity” that Congress “vest[] 
somewhere a discretionary power of granting relief.” Hamilton did 
not say in whom such a power should be vested; given its potential 
impact on the federal fisc, that question was of such “delicacy and 
importance” that it should be the subject of “mature deliberation.” 
But Hamilton clearly did not think Congress should retain the power 
                                                            
91 See infra Part III.B. 
92 Report on the Petition of Christopher Saddler, 19 January 1790 [Saddler Report], 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-06-02-0089. 
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for itself, if only to avoid the “inconvenience” of having to rule on 
individual applications for relief.93 
Hamilton’s lobbying effort bore fruit five months later, when 
Congress passed the Remission Act of 1790. The Act transferred to 
the Treasury Secretary the legislature’s own authority to spare from 
punishment those who unintentionally violated important federal 
revenue laws. As this Part explains, the question of where to locate 
such an important power provoked intense debate in Congress, 
which considered numerous configurations of authority before 
settling on the Treasury Secretary.94 Uncertainty and dispute 
continued through the 1790s, even as the first Treasury 
Secretaries—Hamilton included—exercised the power to its fullest 
extent.95 Ultimately, however, remission became a permanent 
feature of the early administrative landscape, bestowing upon the 
executive a discretionary authority that rivals those that modern 
nondelegationists find so objectionable.96 
A. Remission and Revenue 
At its core, remission was about revenue. When Congress first 
convened in 1789, one its first orders of business was to pass 
legislation regulating the collection of customs duties on goods 
imported into the United States by sea. This was no small matter. 
Customs duties were the federal government’s lifeblood, 
constituting more than ninety percent of total revenue for the first 
two decades following Ratification.97 It is no exaggeration to say 
that, without an effective means of collecting such duties, the federal 
government would simply have been unable to function.98 
There were two principal statutes regulating customs. The 
Collection Act of 1789 served three purposes: It detailed the duties 
owed on various categories of goods; it announced regulations on 
the manner of importation; and it prescribed rules governing federal 
officers’ collection of duties owed.99 Its companion, the Registering 
Act of 1789, had a narrower scope, but was no less important: It 
specified the requirements for registering a ship as a “vessel of the 
                                                            
93 Id. 
94 See infra Part II.B. 
95 See infra Part II.C. 
96 See infra Part II.D. 
97 See Arlyck, supra note __, at 1466. 
98 See GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOM HOUSES AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN STATE 6-8 (2016) (“[C]ustoms revenue almost singlehandedly funded the 
federal government.”) 
99 See generally Collection Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 29. 
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United States,” a status that exempted it from payment of the duties 
on imports specified in the Collection Act.100  
Crucially, both statutes prescribed fines and forfeitures for 
violations of many of the acts’ provisions. These penalties ranged 
broadly, from a one hundred dollar fine for lesser offenses, to 
forfeiture of goods and vessels themselves (often worth thousands 
of dollars).101 To impose a statutorily-prescribed penalty, the 
government had to go to federal district court, which had exclusive 
jurisdiction over all suits for “penalties and forfeitures” under 
federal law.”102 In the vast majority of early forfeiture suits 
adjudicated in federal district court, no one filed a claim in 
opposition, resulting in a default judgment for the government.103 In 
adversarial cases, fines were tried to a jury, but forfeitures (mostly) 
were not.104 
The government’s ability to penalize customs violators was 
crucial. Whenever someone failed to pay the prescribed duties, or 
evaded the customs regime entirely by registering their vessel as 
American, revenue suffered. But collection was difficult. According 
to many historians, early Americans were inveterate smugglers—a 
tradition that dated back to the colonial period and continued 
forward through the War of 1812 and beyond.105 The Atlantic 
coastline’s sheer length presented a huge challenge to the skeletal 
staff of customs officers responsible for collecting customs revenue. 
Given the difficulties federal officers faced in detecting customs 
violations, deterrence depended on the prospect of significant 
penalties. Fines and forfeitures were financially important in a more 
direct way, too. By law, half of any penalty was shared among the 
three principal customs officers for the district in which the seizure 
                                                            
100 See generally Registering Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 55. 
101 See, e.g., Registering Act of 1789, § 30, 1 Stat. 55, 64; Collection Act of 1789, § 12, 1 
Stat. 29, 39. 
102 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. 
103 See Arlyck, supra note __, at 1470, 1488.  
104 See id. at 1471-72. 
105 See, e.g., JOSHUA M. SMITH, BORDERLAND SMUGGLING: PATRIOTS, LOYALISTS, AND 
ILLICIT TRADE IN THE NORTHEAST, 1783-1820 (2006). But cf. RAO, supra note __, at 140-
41 (“Though it is impossible to say with any certainty, in all likelihood only a small fraction 
of American merchants smuggled on a large scale.”) . 
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took place106—a significant financial inducement for federal 
officers whose compensation was otherwise fairly low.107 
There was just one problem: As Hamilton and his 
contemporaries recognized (both in 1790 and later), under the 
customs laws there was a real danger of significant fines and 
forfeitures resulting from unintentional violations. Indeed, the first 
Collection Act created largely a strict liability regime; with a few 
exceptions, those who violated the Act were subject to penalties 
irrespective of whether they intended to evade paying the duties they 
owed.108  
For many contemporaries, this rigidity was essential. 
According to the Remission Act’s chief congressional proponent, 
Fisher Ames, Congress had two choices in designing the customs 
system. It could make the laws governing collection “loosely,” 
which would give customs officers “considerable discretion” in 
executing them. Or it could make the rules “so strict as to be in some 
degree rigid.”109 The latter was the better approach,110 as effective 
revenue collection depended on the consistent application of 
“certain rule[s].”111 Hamilton agreed; as he explained to the New 
York legislature in 1787, “certainty” was one of the two “great 
objects” of any taxation system.112  
The need for “certainty” was especially acute with respect to 
the penalties that attached to statutory violations. As Hamilton 
explained to Congress the same year the Remission Act passed, “the 
security of the revenue” could not depend on voluntary compliance 
with the customs laws.113 Lax enforcement would merely encourage 
those who owed duties on imported goods to “avoid … payment.”114 
Accordingly, as Hamilton’s successor later instructed customs 
                                                            
106 Collection Act of 1789, § 38, 1 Stat. 29. If the forfeiture was recovered thanks to 
information from an informant, that person received a quarter of the proceeds, drawn from 
the principal officers’ share. Id. 
107 See Arlyck, supra note __, at 1469, 1510 n.352. 
108 For example, of the dozens of prohibitions in the Collection Act, only two depended on 
the offender’s state of mind. See Collection Act of 1789, §§ 16, 23, 1 Stat. 29, 41, 43.  
109 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames). 
110 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames) (“He thought the latter the best mode.”) 
111 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1127 (Ames). 
112 Alexander Hamilton to New York Assembly, 17 February 1787, 4 PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 95 (Jacob Cooke, ed., 1961). The other was “equality.” Id. 
113 Final Version: First Report on the Further Provision Necessary for Establishing Public 
Credit, [13 December 1790], https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-07-
02-0227-0003.   
114 Id. 
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collectors, they had to execute the laws “without reference to any 
circumstances of fraud or innocence.”115 Only the “strictest method” 
of enforcement could prevent the revenue system “from being 
deranged.”116 Or, in the words of one of the Remission Act’s 
original proponents in Congress, imposition of the fines and 
forfeitures prescribed for customs violations should be “nearly 
inevitable,” to ensure “safe and effectual collection of the 
revenue.”117 
As everyone recognized, however, strict enforcement of the 
customs laws could result in manifest injustice.118 Indeed, Hamilton 
proposed creation of a remission mechanism precisely because 
violators could be subject to “considerable forfeitures” simply due 
to “inadvertence” or “want of information.”119  Members of 
Congress agreed. “[N]o person,” argued one, “ought to be liable … 
who is not guilty of a violation of the laws intentionally or 
willfully.”120 If the rules governing customs collection were to be 
“strict,” then it was necessary to provide “some relaxation” in 
deserving cases.121 In that sense, remission was a power “co-existent 
with the revenue laws.”122 Indeed, as one representative noted, it 
would be “impossible to get along” without “a power placed 
somewhere to remit penalties.”123 Granting relief in such cases 
would not be a question of “mercy”—it was instead a matter of 
“justice.”124 
The remission power may have been necessary, but it was also 
dangerous. If not exercised carefully, it would lessen the certainty 
of rule-enforcement and hamper revenue collection more than it 
                                                            
115 Oliver Wolcott to Robert Purviance, 6 May 1797, quoted in Frederick Arthur Baldwin 
Dalzell, Taxation with Representation: Federal Revenue in the Early Republic 168 (1993) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University). 
116 Id. 
117 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Lawrence).  
118 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Lawrence) (fines and forfeitures for customs violations 
“ought to be as nearly inevitable as is in any ways consistent with mercy to individuals” 
(emphasis added)). 
119 Saddler Report, supra note __. 
120 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1128 (Sturgis). 
121 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1128 (Lawrence): 
(without remission, “persons absolutely violating the laws, whether intentionally or 
through ignorance, would … be precluded from all relief”); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2291 
(1797) (Coit) (the original 1790 remission act was “necessary” because “[i]t was made the 
duty of officers to prosecute in all cases”). 
122 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (Sitgreaves). 
123 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (Coit). 
124 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1128 (Sturgis). 
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would benefit deserving individuals.125 To members of Congress, it 
was therefore a “delicate power,”126 to be exercised with “a great 
deal of circumspection.”127 Indeed, some representatives opposed 
the Remission Act entirely on the ground that it would undermine 
customs collection and harm the federal fisc.128 Therefore, the goal 
in structuring the remission power, according to Ames, was to grant 
relief while creating “the least risk of injuring the revenue.”129 
B. Locating Remission 
Now came the hard part—figuring out where to locate this 
“delicate power.”130 Up until Hamilton tendered his proposal, the 
task of balancing the need for revenue against the demands of justice 
had fallen on the legislature itself. Before passage of the Remission 
Act (and after), individuals who thought they did not deserve 
punishment for their statutory violations sought relief directly from 
Congress.131  
This was not unusual. Before and after ratification of the 
Constitution, at both the state and national level, individuals 
typically presented their claims against the government to the 
legislature.132 This was true not only with respect to requests for 
government largesse, as with military pensions133 and disaster 
relief,134 but also for those seeking respite from the allegedly unjust 
application of general laws.135 Indeed, as recent scholarship has 
shown, one of the early Congresses’ most important functions was 
                                                            
125 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1129 (Stone). 
126 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames). 
127 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Lawrence). 
128 See 12 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of 
America 175 (Helen E. Veit, ed., 1994) [DHFFC] (“[A] few were of the opinion, that the 
passing of any act for the remission of fines, would operate to a great disadvantage of the 
public revenue.”);  
129 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1127 (Ames) 
130 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames). 
131 See, e.g., 8 DHFFC 421-27 (describing pre-Remission Act petitions submitted to First 
Congress); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1788 (considering two 1797 petitions seeking remission of 
penalties for “having sold wine and spirits by retail, without license”). 
132 See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The 
Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 
637 (1985). 
133 See Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 
YALE L.J. 1538, 1586-87 (2018). 
134 See MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 1-16 (2013). 
135 See Maggie Blackhawk, Equity Outside the Courts, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2042 
(2020). 
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responding to individual petitions seeking legislative favor.136 To 
that end, one of Congresses’ very first acts was to develop a system 
for receiving and responding to petitions, which generally involved 
referral to a congressional committee or to an executive branch 
official.137 The referee would investigate and prepare a report and 
recommendation; Congress would then decide whether to grant the 
requested relief, usually via private bill or resolution.138 
Hamilton’s proposal, however, prompted Congress to divest 
itself entirely of responsibility for remitting fines and forfeitures. 
The challenge lay in reaching agreement as to whom Congress 
should give that power. Under the first remission bill introduced in 
the House, a panel of judicial officers—the local federal district 
judge, district attorney, and marshal—would handle petitions for 
relief.139 A subsequent version of the bill gave the district judge 
alone the power to remit, though remission of a penalty greater than 
$5,000 had to be approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of State, and the Attorney General.140  
When the Senate returned its amended version of the bill, 
however, the district judge’s role was reduced to hearing evidence 
and transmitting a statement of facts to the same three cabinet 
officers, who then made the decision as to whether remission was 
warranted.141 The reasons for the change are not clear, though it 
appears that the Senate modeled its proposal on British practice, in 
which a central administrative board had the power to “relax” the 
revenue laws in “cases of hardship.”142 Hamilton himself suggested 
                                                            
136 See McKinley, supra note __, at 1576-77. 
137 See id. at 1586-87. 
138 Id. 
139 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1127. 
140 6 DHFFC 1482. 
141 6 DHFFC 1485. Under the Senate proposal, only two of the three executive officers 
need to agree in order to grant remission. Id. An earlier proposal in the Senate envisioned 
a more complicated procedure, in which the district judge made the initial determination 
as to whether fraud was involved, then the three cabinet officials decided whether relief 
was warranted in light of the facts, and then the judge made the final decision as to the 
“reasonable” quantum of relief to be granted (but no greater than the amount approved by 
the executive officers). Id. at 1483 n.12. 
142 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1128 (Fitzsimons) 
(urging Congress to consider “the practice in England, where  …  application for relief is 
made to the commissioners”); United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 295 (1825) 
(“The powers given by this statute to the [British] Commissioners of the Treasury, are very 
analogous to those given by our act to the Secretary of the Treasury.”). By statute, British 
commissioners had broad authority to restore forfeited goods that “arose without any 
[d]esign or [i]ntention of [f]raud.” An Act for the More Effectual Prevention of Smuggling 
in this Kingdom 1787, 27 Geo. 3 c. 32, § 15 (UK). 
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as much in his initial recommendation: Creating a discretionary 
power to grant relief would align the U.S. with “the usual policy of 
commercial nations.”143 
Whatever its genesis, the Senate’s switch to centralized 
decisionmaking caused consternation in the House. Critics argued 
that delegating authority to executive officers in Philadelphia would 
delay needed relief for merchants located far from the seat of 
government.144 The Senate proposal also gave the power to officials 
who were less “responsible” than local district judges.145 In 
response, the amendment’s defenders conceded that the new 
proposal would “lengthen” the remission process.146 But that was a 
necessary evil. Centralized decisionmaking was essential to 
ensuring that the laws governing maritime commerce were applied 
consistently and predictably; as one House member put, putting 
remission in the hands of the executive branch would “eventually 
produce strict justice, and tend more effectually to secure the 
revenue.”147 
Critics also questioned the amendment’s constitutionality. 
Specifically, two House members argued that the Senate’s proposal 
improperly granted “judiciary powers” to executive branch 
officials.148 The precise basis for these objections is unclear,149 but 
they may have had some traction. After debate on the Senate version 
of the bill, the House responded with a version that vested remission 
power in the individual justices of the Supreme Court.150  
For reasons unknown,151 the final version of the Act doubled 
down on its concentration of power in the executive branch, by 
giving it to the Treasury Secretary alone. Under the Act, the 
Secretary could remit any penalty incurred under the customs laws 
                                                            
143 Saddler Report.  
144 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Goodhue). 
145 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Jackson). 
146 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1474 (Sherman). 
147 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1474 (Sherman). 
148 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Gerry); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Huntington) (the 
Senate bill “referr[ed] matters of judicial determination to a Chancellorate unknown to the 
Constitution”). 
149 Compare 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Gerry) (suggesting that designating the heads of 
executive departments as “Judges” in deciding on remission petitions infringed on the 
President and Senate’s combined power to appoint federal judges), with 1 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 1475 (Sedgwick) (responding the Gerry’s objection by pointing out that the 
designated department heads had already been constitutionally appointed). 
150 6 DHFFC 1488-89. 
151 Remission Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 122, § 1. No explanation for the change is recorded in 
the published legislative record. I discuss the possibilities in Part IV. 
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if, “in his opinion,” the violation was committed “without wilful 
negligence or any intention of fraud.”152 The Secretary could remit 
the entire penalty, including the customs officers’ share—a power 
not included in the original House proposal. And most importantly, 
he could remit the whole penalty or “any part thereof … upon such 
terms or conditions as he may deem reasonable and just.”153 In other 
words, once the Secretary determined, “in his opinion,” that a 
particular penalty had been incurred without fraudulent intent, he 
had complete discretion to restore to the petitioner as much or as 
little of his property as the Secretary thought reasonable. And it 
really was complete discretion. The Act did not provide for review 
of the Secretary’s decisions—not by the judiciary, not by the 
President, and not by Congress.154 Federal judges were still involved 
in the process, but only to the extent that they heard evidence and 
transmitted a statement of facts the Secretary.155 The decision of 
whether to impose all, some, or none of the prescribed penalty lay 
entirely in the executive branch. 
C. Affirming Remission 
Hamilton and his successors did not hesitate to use the broad 
power Congress gave them. From 1791 to 1809, the Treasury 
Secretaries granted relief in over ninety percent of the remission 
cases presented to them. In most of those cases, they granted nearly 
complete relief, only withholding a small percentage of the penalty 
to pay for court costs. But in roughly a third of cases the Secretaries 
exercised their authority to grant whatever partial relief they deemed 
“just and reasonable.” The level of partial remission varied widely; 
in most cases the Secretaries remitted all but a small portion of the 
penalty, but in certain cases the government retained substantial 
sums.156 
Despite—or perhaps because of—the Secretaries’ willing 
exercise of their power, remission became more entrenched over the 
next decade. The 1790 Act was supposed to expire after a year.157 
                                                            
152 Remission Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 122, § 1. 
153 Remission Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 122, § 1. 
154 See United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 285 (1825) (concluding that “no 
one can question” the Secretary’s determination regarding a petitioner’s fraudulent intent: 
“It is a subject committed to his sound discretion.”).  I am aware of no court case involving 
a challenge to a remission decision by a disappointed petitioner. Cf. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) at 288-89 (rejecting customs officer’s challenge to the Act’s grant of authority to 
remit the portion of a fine or forfeiture due to the officer). 
155 See Arlyck, supra note __, at 1484 & n.212. 
156 See id. at 1487-88. 
157 Remission Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 122, § 2. 
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As a member of the House later explained, Congress included this 
sunset provision as a concession to those who had concerns about 
“the propriety of the law.”158 Yet the legislature repeatedly 
reauthorized the remission statute in the 1790s,159 and added parallel 
remission provisions to other laws related to revenue and 
commerce.160 
That said, when Congress sought to consolidate and expand the 
Treasury Secretary’s authority in 1797, a brief but sharp debate 
erupted over further extension of such broad and unreviewable 
authority.161 The legislation’s proponents leaned heavily on 
precedent. The new bill, they argued, largely confirmed the 
authority the Secretary had exercised from the days of the First 
Congress—and had exercised properly.162  
In response, critics acknowledged that the Secretary’s powers 
under the proposed bill were substantially the same as before. What 
they questioned was “the principle of the law.”163 For the most part, 
they questioned whether it was a good idea to concentrate so much 
power in the hands of single individual.164 Doing so gave him great 
“influence,” critics charged, which he might use for the benefit of 
the wealthy and powerful and to the detriment of the public 
interest.165 This was especially true because the Secretary’s decision 
was wholly unreviewable; with no one to “call him to account,” 
nothing prevented him from exercising his discretionary authority 
in ways that favored a chosen few.166  
                                                            
158 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (Coit). 
159 Act of Mar. 2, 1795, 1 Stat. 425, 425; Act of May 8, 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. 275, 275; Act of 
Mar. 3, 1791, § 1, 1 Stat. 218, 218. 
160 See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1791, § 43, 1 Stat. 199, 209 (power to remit fines and 
forfeitures incurred for violating act regulating distilled spirits); Embargo Act of 1799, § 6, 
1 Stat. 61 (same for 1799 embargo against France). 
161 In addition to remitting fines and forfeitures, the 1797 Act gave the Secretary the 
additional power to remit “disabilities”—for instance, if a ship was denied an American 
registry (entitling it to lower tonnage duties), the Secretary could order that it be provided 
one. See Act of Mar. 3, 1797, § 1, 1 Stat. 506, 506; 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (Sitgreaves) 
(1797 expansion of remission power was meant to include laws for registering and 
licensing vessels). 
162 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2290, 2291 (Coit) 
163 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (Livingston). 
164 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (W. Lyman) (the authority to remit all revenue-related 
penalties was a power “too great to be left to any one man”); id. 2287 (Swanwick) (“[T]he 
powers proposed to be pIaced in the Secretary of the Treasury were … too large to be put 
in the hands of any one person.”); id. 2286 (Livingston) (similar). 
165 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Livingston). 
166 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2291 (Livingston). 
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Remission’s most vocal critic, Edward Livingston, went 
further. In his view, the entire remission scheme was 
unconstitutional—because it delegated legislative authority to an 
executive branch officer. The power to remit penalties was 
originally “lodged” in the legislature, and Congress had no right to 
“delegate it to another.”167 He flatly rejected the argument that 
delegation was needed to free the House from the burdensome 
responsibility of responding to individual petitions.168 According to 
Livingston, their constituents had elected them precisely to attend to 
such matters. “Were they to get rid of this business, by throwing it 
upon their officers?,” he asked.169 No—remission was “Legislative 
business” which “should not be transferred from [Congress’s] 
hands.”170 
Livingston’s nondelegation critique was forceful, but it did not 
last long. Perhaps sensing that his colleagues did not share his 
constitutional scruples, he quickly switched gears. If the burden of 
responding to individual claims for relief was “too great [for] the 
Legislature,” then the better option would be for remission to be 
exercised by a multi-member “Board,” whose decisions would be 
subject to “appeal.”171 When the House decisively voted down that 
amendment, Livingston changed course again, arguing—rather 
incoherently—that the 1797 bill effectively gave the Treasury 
Secretary “the power to pardon crimes,” which the Constitution 
vested only in the President.172 
In the end, Livingston’s constitutional and policy arguments 
failed to defeat the bill. He was not alone in his opposition—other 
members of the House voiced serious doubts, and the vote in favor 
of the bill was 50 to 34.173 The vote was partisan, though not entirely 
so; of the yeas, 12 Republicans joined 38 Federalist colleagues in 
supporting the bill (only one Federalist voted in opposition). To 
                                                            
167 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (Livingston); see also 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (the 
remission bill “place[d] in the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury Legislative 
business”). 
168 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (Livingston). 
169 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (Livingston). 
170 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (Livingston). 
171 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288-89 (Livingston). Specifically, Livingston proposed that the 
Vice-President, the Secretaries of State and Treasury, and the Attorney General collectively 
rule on remission, to guard against the pernicious effect that “influence” could have on one 
person. Id. Livingston did not specify to whom the board’s decisions should be appealed. 
172 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2290-91 (Livingston).  
173 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (W. Lyman); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (Swanwick); 6 
ANNALS OF CONG. 2292 (Nicholas); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2292 (vote). 
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mollify the objectors’ concerns, the act was set to expire in 1801.174 
But in 1800 Congress made the Remission Act permanent.175 
Moreover, in future years, Republican-controlled Congresses 
included parallel remission provisions in other statutes.176  
Ironically, the person most affected by Congress’s steady 
expansion of the remission power was one of the 1797 Act’s 
opponents, Albert Gallatin. As a first-term representative from 
western Pennsylvania, Gallatin voted against the bill.177 Though his 
reasons for opposing it are unknown, a year later Gallatin argued 
(unsuccessfully) that a bill giving the President broad discretion to 
raise a provisional army of up to 20,000 troops was an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive 
branch.178 Yet when the Jeffersonian Republicans swept into power 
in 1800 and Gallatin became Treasury Secretary, he used the 
remission authority as extensively as his Federalist predecessors.179 
Indeed, when a Federalist member of Congress accused Gallatin of 
not granting relief generously enough during the War of 1812, an 
investigating House committee concluded that he had exercised the 
remission authority in a manner both “liberal” and “just.”180 
D. Remission and Discretion 
To recap: Less than a year after the Constitution’s ratification, 
Congress delegated, to a single executive branch official, broad and 
wholly unreviewable authority to modify penalties the legislature 
had designated for violations of critically important federal law, in 
whatever way the official deemed “reasonable and just” (including 
imposing no penalty at all).181 The power delegated was a core 
                                                            
174 Remission Act of 1797, ch. 13, § 4, 1 Stat. 506, 507 (continuing remission power 
through the end of the next session of Congress); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288 (Swanwick) 
(the sunset provision was “was the only thing which would make [the bill] in any degree 
palatable”). 
175 Act of Feb. 11, 1800, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 7, 7 (extending remission power “without limitation 
of time”). 
176 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 27, 1813, ch. 33, § 1, 2 Stat. 804, 805 (authorizing remission of 
“all fines, penalties, and forfeitures” incurred under the Jeffersonian embargo laws); Act 
of Jan. 9, 1808, § 6, 2 Stat. 453, 454 (power to remit fines and forfeitures incurred for 
violating embargo act). 
177 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2292. 
178 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1538; Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 103-04. 
179 See Arlyck, supra note __, at 1488 & n.228. 
180 25 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 1282 (1813). 
181 There is no indication that the term “reasonable and just” was a legal term of art with a 
specific meaning the Secretary could readily apply to a particular set of facts. See Parrillo, 
Critical Assessment, supra note __, at 53-54 (phrase “just and equitable” was not a term of 
art in the late 18th century); American Railroads, 575 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring 
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legislative power—the legislature’s traditional authority to waive 
enforcement of the laws it had enacted, in response to individual 
petitions for relief.182 Congress made—and repeatedly affirmed—
this delegation despite the acknowledged importance of exercising 
this power carefully,183 in the face of serious concerns about the 
wisdom of concentrating too much power in the hands of an 
unaccountable government officer,184 and over objections that it was 
constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to do so.185 
To appreciate the breadth of the delegation Congress made in 
the Remission Act, we can compare it to the statute that Justice 
Gorsuch found so objectionable in Gundy. The Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requires individuals 
convicted of a sex offense to register in a national system, and sets 
forth the registration requirements they must fulfill.186 Yet the 
statute gives the Attorney General authority to decide which 
requirements apply to individuals convicted prior to SORNA’s 
enactment.187 Justice Gorsuch complained that this discretion 
effectively empowered the nation’s chief law enforcement officer 
“to write his own criminal code” governing numerous citizens.188 
Making matters worse, the Secretary was “free to change his mind 
at any point” about which requirements to impose on offenders.189 
The discretion Congress afforded the Treasury Secretary in 
1790 was remarkably similar. Like the Attorney General under 
SORNA, the Secretary had free reign to decide the extent to which 
statutory provisions would apply to those who violated the law. The 
Secretary was “free to change his mind at any point” about what 
penalties to impose on offenders.190 In fact, unlike the Attorney 
General, the Secretary could change his approach on a case-by-case 
basis.191 And he similarly made such decisions with zero guidance 
                                                            
in the judgment) (suggesting that application of the terms “unequal” and “unreasonable” 
“could be said to call for the President to exercise policy judgment”). 
182 See supra Part II.B. 
183 See supra Part II.A. 
184 See supra Part II.B. 
185 See supra Part II.C. 
186 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2122 (plurality opinion). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
189 Id. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
190 Id. 
191 In practice, it appears that the early Treasury Secretaries may have been more consistent 
in their approach to remission than the Attorneys General were regarding the application 
of SORNA’s registration requirements. Compare Arlyck, supra note __, at 1487-89 
(describing broadly consistent rates of remission across two decades), with Gundy, 139 
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from Congress as to what portion of a penalty to remit, other than 
whatever amount he deemed “reasonable and just.”192 
To be sure, the Secretary’s discretion under the Remission Act 
was not entirely unbounded. But the same is true of the Attorney 
General under SORNA. The Secretary could only grant remission 
to a congressionally-defined subset of offenders—those who had 
acted with no fraudulent intent. SORNA similarly gives the 
Attorney General discretion only with respect to pre-Act 
offenders.193 Under the Remission Act, the Secretary could only 
choose a penalty within the statutory limits set by Congress. That is 
just like what Justice Gorsuch found so objectionable in SORNA; it 
allows the Attorney General to impose on pre-Act offenders “all of 
the statute’s requirements, some of them, or none of them.”194 
Finally, the Secretary had to grant remission that was, in his view, 
“reasonable and just.” Though SORNA’s text includes no like 
qualifier, Justice Gorsuch rejected the argument that a similarly 
vague limitation would render SORNA’s delegation permissible.195 
To be sure, SORNA and the Remission Act are not identical.196 
But the nondelegation “alarms” that Justice Gorsuch thinks SORNA 
rings so loudly are likewise present in the Remission Act. As in 
2006, in 1790 Congress effectively gave the Cabinet officer with 
primary responsibility for law enforcement “the power to write a 
                                                            
S.Ct. at 2132 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (detailing post-SORNA shifts in Attorney General 
policy). But the possibility that the Treasury Secretaries happened to exercise their 
discretion more consistently does not make the initial delegation any less capacious. 
192 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)  (“In the end, there isn’t a single 
policy decision concerning pre-Act offenders on which Congress even tried to speak ….”). 
193 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).  
194 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also Rappaport, supra note __, 
at 317-18 (arguing that “permissive” appropriations violate the nondelegation doctrine). 
195 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality’s 
inferred statutory command to register pre-Act offenders “to the maximum extent feasible” 
had “many possible meanings,” and thus left the Attorney General “free to make all the 
important policy decisions”); cf. also Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note __, at 340 
(describing a hypothetical statutory command to “promote goodness and niceness” as being 
“so vacuous that any attempt to implement this law would amount to creation of a new 
law”). 
196 One difference is that the Remission Act delegated authority over penalties, while 
SORNA grants discretion regarding substantive liability (i.e., the registration requirements 
applicable to pre-SORNA offenders). But nothing in Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy opinion 
suggests that a delegation of authority to rewrite the penalties that attach to a statutory 
violation would be constitutionally permissible. See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2144-45 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“To allow the nation’s chief law enforcement officer to write the 
criminal laws he is charged with enforcing … would be to mark the end of any meaningful 
enforcement of our separation of powers ….”). 
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criminal code rife with his own policy choices.”197 In other words, 
immediately after ratification Congress conferred on the Treasury 
Secretary a quantum of legislative authority similar in scope to a 
modern power that at least three justices of the current Supreme 
Court believe patently violates an originalist understanding of 
nondelegation. Accordingly, if the Remission Act is to be found 
compatible with an originalist argument in favor of strict limits on 
Congress’s power to delegate, the explanation must lie elsewhere. 
III. JUSTIFYING DELEGATION 
If the remission power Congress conferred on the Treasury 
Secretary in 1790 looks like a blatant violation of the nondelegation 
principle advanced by present-day originalists, is there some way to 
explain it? Viewing the Remission Act through the prism of various 
theories that nondelegationists have developed to explain early 
delegations more generally, several possibilities arise. One is that 
Congress did not actually grant the Secretary legislative authority, 
or at least not legislative authority that only Congress can exercise. 
Instead, it gave him a sort of judicial power, or it merely confirmed 
a power the executive branch already enjoyed (albeit in different 
form).198 A second possibility is that the Remission Act was a 
delegation of legislative authority, but a permissible one—either 
because it came under a particular subject-matter “exception” to 
general nondelegation principles, or because it wasn’t a sufficiently 
significant delegation to pose a constitutional problem.199 
As this Part demonstrates, none of these explanations are fully 
satisfactory. Remission certainly resembles traditional exercises of 
judicial or executive authority (like prosecutorial discretion or 
pardon). And if one squints hard enough, remission might qualify as 
permissible exercise of legislative power under one exception or 
another. But in truth the Remission Act does not fit comfortably into 
any of these categories. The Treasury Secretary’s authority was 
meaningfully different from typical judicial or executive power, and 
does not qualify as an exception.  
More importantly, no one at the Founding justified remission 
on any of these grounds. Indeed, as this Part shows, there is almost 
no evidence that members of the Founding generation thought 
about—let alone justified—early delegations in these terms.200 This 
                                                            
197 Id. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
198 See infra Part III.A. 
199 See infra Part III.B. 
200 See infra Part III.B. 
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is a crucial point, for if contemporaries did not distinguish between 
lawful and unlawful delegations in these ways, then it is difficult 
(perhaps impossible) to reconcile a number of important early 
delegations with a stringent original understanding of 
nondelegation. In other words, the Remission Act is just one of 
many Founding-era delegations that instead point to a permissive 
original understanding of Congress’s authority to grant legislative 
power to the executive branch. 
A. Delegation of Nonlegislative Power 
One way to explain the Remission Act is to consider it as an 
exercise of nonlegislative power. Depending on how one frames 
what the Remission Act authorized the Treasury Secretary to do, he 
might have been exercising either judicial or executive authority. As 
explained in this subpart, remission was sufficiently different from 
typical exercises of judicial or executive authority that it cannot 
easily be explained as either. And save for one fleeting exception 
discussed below, no one in Congress defended the Remission Act’s 
constitutionality on the ground that it delegated judicial or executive 
power (in fact, remission’s resemblance to judicial power was an 
argument for its unconstitutionality). 
Of course, the most important reason to doubt that remission 
was an exercise of judicial or executive power is that, at the 
Founding, it was indisputably a form of legislative authority. Recall 
that both before and after passage of the 1790 Act, remission was 
exercised in the first instance by the legislature.201 Indeed, as 
discussed in Part IV, Congress repeatedly extended the Act in no 
small part because it wanted to divest itself of the responsibility of 
deciding such petitions.202 To be sure, the legislative power to grant 
relief from undeserved penalties may not have been precisely the 
same power as the authority to enact prospective legislation.203 But 
if equity is now generally associated with courts, the early 
Congresses routinely exercised this sort of authority—primarily 
through the petitioning process.204 Whether they supported the Act 
                                                            
201 See supra Part II.B. 
202 See infra Part IV.A. 
203 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288 (Ames) (likening remission to a sort of “chancery 
power”). But equity is now generally associated with courts, the early Congresses routinely 
exercised this sort of power—primarily through the petitioning process. See Blackhawk, 
supra note __. 
204 See Blackhawk, supra note __. Indeed, one of the early Congresses’ most important 
functions was responding to individual petitions seeking legislative favor, and often 
responded through private bills—i.e., through legislation. See McKinley, supra note __, at 
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or opposed it, members of Congress recognized that they had 
“transferred” to the Secretary their collective authority to adjust 
statutory penalties in individual cases as they saw fit.205 
1. Judicial Power 
Even if the Remission Act delegated authority exercised by 
Congress in the first instance, could it have passed constitutional 
muster because remission mimicked an exercise of judicial power? 
After all, the Act required the Treasury Secretary to apply a legal 
standard (set by Congress) to particular facts.206 Before granting 
remission, the Secretary had to conclude that the statutory violation 
at issue occurred without fraudulent intent.207 The Act granted the 
Secretary discretion in imposing a penalty for lawbreaking, a power 
federal courts traditionally enjoyed (at least until the advent of the 
federal sentencing guidelines).208 Moreover, in practice the early 
remission process was an alternative forum to the courts for 
determining what penalties would attached to violations of the 
customs laws.209 This resemblance is perhaps why two members of 
Congress suggested in 1790 that the Act granted “judiciary powers” 
to executive branch officials.210  
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205 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (Livingston); see also 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames) (the 
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often responded through private bills—i.e., through legislation. See McKinley, supra note 
__, at 1576-77 (until the mid-twentieth century, “private bills” were a primary “means of 
resolving petitions for private claims”). 
206 See Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 280 (1855) (stating 
that any administrative duty involving the application of law to fact can be understood as 
“a judicial act”). Some nondelegationists suggest that applying law to fact may also be an 
executive act. See Gordon, supra note __, at 755; Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 
__, at 364. 
207 Remission Act of 1790, §1, 1 Stat. 122, 123. 
208 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989). 
209 See Arlyck, supra note __, at 1485-86. For example, claimants defending against a 
government forfeiture suit filed a remission petition with the court, which stayed its 
proceedings until the Treasury Secretary ruled on the petition. Id. And the remission 
process itself had some of the trappings of proceedings in court. Id. 
210 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Gerry); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Huntington) (the 
Senate bill “referr[ed] matters of judicial determination to a Chancellorate unknown to the 
Constitution”). 
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Yet there is no indication that this similarity is what persuaded 
the early Congress that the Remission Act was constitutionally 
permissible. Indeed, for the 1790 critics, bestowing “judiciary 
powers” on executive branch officials rendered remission 
unconstitutional.211 And while the historical limits on Congress’s 
ability to grant adjudicatory authority to non-Article III tribunals are 
notoriously murky,212 the Remission Act might very well have 
transgressed them.213 
Accordingly, the fact that the Act passed—repeatedly—
suggests that members of Congress did not believe that remission 
was judicial power. For good reason. Notably, remission could 
operate before or after judgment in federal district court.214 In 
addition, the Treasury Secretary did not decide liability. Though the 
final version of the Act did not require a formal confession of 
judgment by the petitioner, it “presuppose[d]” that an offense had 
been committed, and provided an avenue for relief for the innocent 
after.215 This is likely why the Act’s fiercest critic, Edward 
Livingston, rejected the analogy to judicial power in 1797, and the 
possibility never again seemed to trouble the early Congress.216 
Even if remission was not conceptually part of the “judicial 
power” at the Founding, could its adjudicatory qualities nonetheless 
explain why the Act did not offend nondelegation principles? In 
Gundy, Justice Gorsuch characterized nondelegation as a 
constitutional prohibition on delegations of power to establish 
“generally applicable rules” governing “future actions.”217 
                                                            
211 See supra notes __ to __. 
212 See William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1513 
(2020) (“[T]he internal logic of this longstanding practice is itself obscure and 
mysterious.”). 
213 Some scholars—and the Supreme Court—suggest that Congress can delegate judicial 
power over “public rights,” but not “private rights.” See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., 
LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.Ct.  1365 (2018); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication 
in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (2007). Categorizing a delegation as 
involving a public or private right is often challenging, see Oil States, 138 S.Ct. at 1373, 
but, as discussed below, see infra Part III.B.2, remission is best understood as involving 
the latter, see Nelson, supra, at 563 (“[O]nly entities with judicial power [could] 
authoritatively declare the loss of an individual’s core ‘private rights’ to life, liberty, or 
property.”). 
214 United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. 246, 287 (1825); Power of the Exec. to Remit 
Forfeitures., 4 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 573, 574 (1847). 
215 United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. 246, 291 (1825). 
216 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (Livingston) (concluding that the power granted the 
Treasury Secretary was “not … of a judicial nature”). 
217 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also American Railroads, 575 
U.S. at 70 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (an originalist reading of the 
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Presumably what Justice Gorsuch had in mind is the sort of formal 
rulemaking authority one associates with modern administrative 
agencies—the kind of authority at issue in Gundy itself.218 In 
contrast, remission decisions were individualized and retrospective. 
So even if the Treasury Secretary’s remission power derived from 
Congress, perhaps the Constitution permits delegation of case-by-
case adjudicatory authority. 
A distinction between adjudication and rulemaking cannot be 
what spared the Remission Act from invalidation on nondelegation 
grounds. For starters, while the Secretaries’ remission decisions 
were not “rules” in the formal sense, they did operate generally and 
prospectively. The Secretaries applied general rules across cases,219 
and appeared to treat past decisions as precedent to follow when 
ruling on future petitions.220 Remission decisions were not formally 
made public, but it appears that members of the merchant 
community learned about them, and shaped their behavior 
accordingly.221 To be sure, the guidance that the Secretaries and the 
public took from past decisions were not administrative “rules” in 
the modern sense—binding regulations subject to the notice and 
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.222 But as 
a form of “adjudicatory precedent” they prospectively seem to have 
                                                            
Constitution prohibits Congress from giving the executive branch “the discretion to 
formulate generally applicable rules of private conduct”). 
218 See 34 U.S.C. §§ 20913(d) (granting the Attorney General “to prescribe rules 
for …  registration”). 
219 For example, even when granting complete remission, the Secretaries invariably 
withheld a small portion of the penalty to cover court costs, except in rare cases of “great 
hardship.” 25 ANNALS OF CONG. app. at 1286. In other words, the Secretaries adopted and 
consistently applied a rule—mandatory payment of court costs, except in hardship cases—
that was not in the Remission Act itself. 
220 When he went to western Pennsylvania in 1794 to help put down the Whiskey Rebellion, 
Hamilton worried that there was not enough time to explain to Oliver Wolcott (then his 
second-in-command) “the principles which have governed [remission] in the past.” So he 
told Wolcott to decide difficult cases by “consulting the most recent precedents.” From 
Alexander Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Junior, 29 September 1794, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-17-02-0263; see also id. (noting the 
“course of policy” Hamilton had taken with respect to remissions). 
221 See Letter from Alexander Campbell to William Heth (Nov. 1, 1792) (enclosed in Letter 
from William Heth to Alexander Hamilton (Nov. 19, 1792)), in 13 The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton 163, 164 (Harold C. Syrett ed., digital ed. 2011) (federal district attorney 
complaining that local merchants viewed Hamilton’s generous approach to remission as a 
license to ignore the customs laws). 
222 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553. This formulation of course vastly oversimplifies the ways 
in which administrative agencies can articulate “rules” governing private conduct. See 
Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1466-69 (1992) 
(describing four types of administrative rulemaking, not all of which involve notice-and-
comment). 
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shaped the future conduct of both the government and private 
parties.223 
More importantly, a deficit of rule-like qualities cannot be what 
exempts remission from scrutiny on nondelegation grounds. 
Whether by formal regulations or individual determinations, the 
Treasury Secretary regulated private conduct based on nothing more 
than his opinion about what quantum of penalty a petitioner should 
pay.224 If anything, executive branch power to alter legislatively-
prescribed penalties on a case-by-case basis should be more 
troubling than the power to adjust them prospectively via general 
rules. The latter, at least, provides “fair warning” to regulated parties 
regarding the legal consequences of their conduct.225 This may be 
why a nondelegationist like Justice Thomas believes that “ad hoc” 
executive decisions “based on a policy judgment” violate the 
nondelegation doctrine as much as prospective regulations,226 and 
why James Madison attacked a 1798 delegation of adjudicatory 
authority to the President on nondelegation grounds.227 However 
                                                            
223 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (administrative agencies have the 
choice to establish rules “by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation”); Strauss, supra 
note __, at 1473 (“adjudicatory precedent” establishes principles “to which the public may 
be held unless the agency is persuaded not to apply it”). For a recent overview of the variety 
of forms of administrative agency adjudication, see generally Christopher J. Walker & 
Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CAL. L. REV. 141 
(2019). 
224 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (critiquing SORNA giving the 
Attorney General “the power to write a criminal code rife with his own policy choices”). 
225 See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964) (under the Due Process 
Clause, “a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime”); 
Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments, the Structural Constitution, and the 
Problem of Executive “Underenforcement,” 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1677, 1712 (2016) 
(“Categorical pronouncements have frequently been used to direct executive branch 
subordinates, and they provide greater transparency, predictability, and guidance than case-
by-case delegation does.”). 
226 American Railroads, 575 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see 
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40 (1924) (rejecting a nondelegation challenge to the Secretary 
of Labor’s adjudicatory authority to deport aliens the Secretary found, “after hearing,” to 
be “undesirable residents of the United States”). Nondelegationist scholars seem to agree. 
For example, the Patent Act of 1790 gave the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and 
the Attorney General the power to grant patents to any new invention those officers deemed 
“sufficiently useful or important.” See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 75-76; see 
generally infra Part IV.B. Nondelegationists justify this broad delegation of authority on 
grounds other than its adjudicatory qualities. See Wurman, supra note __, at 52 (arguing 
that the Patent Act was consistent with nondelegation principles because it “surely 
addressed most” of the important issues the Act implicated); Gordon, supra note __, at 795-
98 (arguing—incorrectly—that the Act was modified in response to nondelegation 
objections). 
227 The Alien Act of 1798 empowered the president to deport individual aliens “he shall 
judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.” An Act Concerning Aliens, 
1 Stat. 570-71 (1798). Madison argued that the statute was unconstitutional in part because 
it lacked “any precise rules” cabining the president’s discretion. James Madison, Report of 
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much remission resembled an exercise of judicial authority, that is 
not the reason it survived constitutional scrutiny. 
2. Executive Power 
If an analogy to judicial authority does not explain why the 
Remission Act passed constitutional muster, might its similarity to 
familiar species of executive authority provide the answer? 
Remission looks like prosecutorial discretion or the pardon power—
executive acts that affect legal liability but have never been 
understood to violate nondelegation principles. In that sense, the 
remission power might be seen as a “nonexclusive” legislative 
power—one that Congress can exercise itself or can delegate to the 
executive branch,228 perhaps because it is akin to other powers the 
Constitution vests in the executive branch.229 
These explanations for the Remission Act fail for reasons 
similar to the analogy to judicial authority. First, despite the 
similarities, no one at the Founding justified remission on these 
bases. Second, remission was different from both prosecutorial 
discretion and the pardon power in meaningful ways. 
Take prosecutorial discretion. As Gary Lawson has suggested, 
remission looks a lot like executive authority not to seek penalties 
for lawbreaking.230 Though the timing is different, the effect is 
functionally the same. And as discussed below,231 there is evidence 
suggesting that some members of Congress saw the Remission Act 
as a means of centralizing law enforcement discretion in a single 
person, rather than allow front-line officers to use it in potentially 
inconsistent or even corrupt ways.232 In fact, the Act itself expressly 
                                                            
the Committee to Whom Were Referred the Communications of Various States, Relative 
to the Resolutions of the Last General Assembly of this State, Concerning the Alien and 
Sedition Laws (1799). 
228 See Wurman, supra note __, at 38-44 (discussing the distinction between exclusive and 
nonexclusive legislative powers). I address Wurman’s distinction in Part III.B.3, infra. 
229 See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2 (granting the President the power “to grant reprieves and 
pardons for offenses against the United States”); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 
(1985) (“[T]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict [is] a decision 
which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch 
as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.’”). 
230 Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note __, at 401. 
231 See infra notes __ to __ and accompanying text. 
232 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames) (giving the Secretary authority to relax 
application of “strict rules” was preferable to making them “loosely” and giving 
“considerable discretion to the officers in the[ir] execution”); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2291 
(Coit) (“It was made the duty of officers to prosecute in all cases, and it was necessary, 
therefore, in some to remit the fines.”).  
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granted the Treasury Secretary the power both to remit penalties 
incurred and to “discontinue[]” prosecutions.233 Perhaps remission 
therefore poses no delegation problem because it was, as Lawson 
argues, merely “a routine part of the executive function.”234 
Or consider another possibility—that remission was simply an 
instantiation of the pardon power.235 This theory also has intuitive 
appeal, given that remission operated as a form of forgiveness for 
legal liability already “incurred” (though not yet formally 
adjudicated).236 Perhaps this is why Joseph Story, in his famous 
Commentaries of 1833, stated in passing that “remission of fines, 
penalties, and forfeitures” was “included” in the pardon power, 
whether exercised by the President directly or “confided to the 
treasury department” by statute.237 Though Story wrote more than 
four decades after Ratification, perhaps his intuition was correct.  
Of course, if the Remission Act merely affirmed a power the 
executive already enjoyed, one imagines the Act’s Founding-era 
defenders would have made that argument in response to 
constitutional doubts. With perhaps one fleeting exception,238 they 
did not. As discussed in Part IV, remission proponents largely 
justified the Act on functional grounds.239 In fact, for Edward 
Livingston, an analogy between remission and the pardon power 
provoked constitutional difficulties, rather than resolve them.240 
                                                            
233 Remission Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 122. 
234 Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note __, at 401; see also Reynolds v. United States, 
565 U.S. 432, 450 (2012) (Scalia, J.,  dissenting) (“giv[ing] the Attorney General the power 
to reduce congressionally imposed requirements” would not pose a nondelegation question 
because “such a power is little more than a formalized version of the time-honored practice 
of prosecutorial discretion”). 
235 See Gordon, supra note __, at 793 (“[R]emission of fines may also be viewed as 
incidental to the pardon power ….”). 
236 Remission Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 122; see also United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. 246, 291 
(1825) (the Remission Act “presupposes[] that the offence has been committed,” and 
simply “affords relief for … unintentional error”).  
237 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATEs 353-54 
(1833); see also WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICa 177 (1829) (“The remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures, under the revenue 
laws, is included in [the pardon power].”). 
238 At one point in the 1797 debate the Act’s most vocal proponent, Fisher Ames, described 
remission in passing as “Executive business,” 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames), though 
did not pursue that argument and focused his defense on functional considerations, id. 
2288. 
239 See supra Part IV. 
240 In the 1797 debates Livingston complained (albeit incoherently) that remission 
effectively gave the Treasury Secretary the power to pardon crimes. See 6 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 2290 (Livingston). As others observed, the Constitution reserved this power for the 
President alone. See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2292 (Nicholas). 
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This may be why Congress in 1791 expressly disclaimed that 
remission affected the President’s pardon power.241 It is of course 
possible that the members of Congress who consistently voted in 
favor of remission did so because they secretly thought it was a 
power the executive branch already enjoyed. But the historical 
record gives us no indication this was so. 
Moreover, there is a better explanation for why no one at the 
Founding justified remission as an aspect of enforcement discretion 
or the pardon power: Remission was different from both. For 
example, under the Remission Act, the Secretary could remit an 
entire forfeiture or fine, including the half share to which customs 
officers were statutorily entitled. That was something that 
contemporaries agreed the President could not do via pardon,242 
likely because pardons could not infringe on private rights vested by 
statute.243 As a result, if Story was suggesting that remission derived 
from the pardon power, he was simply wrong.   
Remission also does not fit comfortably under the rubric of 
enforcement discretion, though here the distinctions are admittedly 
finer. First, such discretion is limited by the policy choices Congress 
has already made. Prosecutors can choose from a limited menu of 
charging options, or they can decide not to charge at all. But they 
cannot invent new prohibitions and penalties, and then impose 
them.244 In contrast, the remission power gave the Treasury 
                                                            
241 See Act of March 3, 1791, § 3, 1 Stat. 218 (“[N]othing in the said act shall be construed 
to limit or restrain the power of the President of the United States, to grant pardons for 
offences against the United States.”). 
242 This was the conclusion reached by Richard Harison in 1791, Hamilton’s close friend 
and the federal district attorney for New York. To Alexander Hamilton from Richard 
Harison, 24 May 1791, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-08-02-
0326. Though Harison was not “assured” that he was correct, id., the Washington 
Administration apparently adhered to his view, see To George Washington from Alexander 
Hamilton, 9 June 1794, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-16-02-
0167 (recommending a pardon for a customs infraction, “which would operate to remit one 
half the penalty incurred”). So did later administrations. See Power of the Executive to 
Remit Forfeitures, 4 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 573, 576–77 (1847) (unlike remission, the pardon 
power does not extend to officer’s share of a forfeiture).  
243 See Nelson, supra note __, at 568 (discussing the nineteenth century view that a pardon 
cannot “‘release and acquit ... private rights.’” (quoting Passenger Laws-Pardoning Power, 
6 Op. Att’y Gen. 393, 403 (1854)). 
244 The same is arguably not true for enforcement discretion’s cousin, settlement authority. 
At least when it comes to civil penalties, the government and the defendants can agree to 
any punishment within statutory and regulatory limits. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair 
or Foul?: Sec Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for Reform Through Removal 
Legislation, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1181 (2016) (“The vast majority of SEC 
enforcement actions … are settled simultaneously with the initiation of the action.”). And 
government agencies can seek and impose such penalties via administrative proceedings, 
rather than in court. See id. at 1145 (discussing SEC administrative proceedings). Of 
course, originalist-minded critics of the administrative state are no more comfortable with 
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Secretary discretion to decide what penalty was “reasonable and 
just,” subject only to a statutory cap that was often quite high. The 
Secretary did not simply choose among fixed legislative options; he 
made a policy decision about what punishment fit the crime.245 The 
distinction between a limited menu and a blank check is important, 
as it may be what reconciles a strong version of nondelegation with 
historical toleration of executive enforcement discretion.246 It is the 
delegated power to make rules, rather than simply choose among 
them, that offends nondelegation principles. 
Second, unlike garden-variety prosecutorial discretion, 
remission was binding on the government. Ordinarily, the choice not 
to enforce the law does not bar later enforcement for the same 
violation (perhaps by a successor administration).247 In contrast, a 
grant of remission permanently foreclosed the government’s ability 
to impose a penalty for the violation in question. This distinction 
also seems important, at least for nondelegationists who suggest that 
enforcement discretion is constitutionally tolerable because it does 
not alter the regulated party’s underlying legal liability.248 
Accordingly, the Remission Act should trouble nondelegationists 
                                                            
this state of affairs than they are with a permissive nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., 
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 227 (“[A]dministrative adjudication 
dangerously restores an extralegal judicial regime.”) 
245 Notably, early Congresses demonstrated that they knew how to limit the Treasury 
Secretary’s discretion when it wanted to. See Act of Feb. 27, 1813, § 1, 2 Stat. 804, 805 
(“direct[ing]” the Secretary to remit “all fines, penalties, and forfeitures” incurred under 
various embargo acts, if the imported goods were American property and properly 
reported). 
246 Gary Lawson suggests as much. In his view, “[t]he executive department always has 
prosecutorial discretion to decide … what levels and kinds of statutorily-permitted 
penalties to seek.” Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note __, at 401 (emphasis added); see 
also Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 448-50 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating 
that a hypothetical version of SORNA that imposed all registration requirements but 
granted the Attorney General discretion to make case-by-case exceptions would be 
acceptable as “a formalized version of the time-honored practice of prosecutorial 
discretion”); cf. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125–26 (1979) (once Congress 
has “demarcate[d] the range of penalties that prosecutors and judges may seek and 
impose,” it has “fulfilled its duty,” and the power it has delegated to executive branch 
officials “is no broader than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing the criminal 
laws”). In his brief discussion of remission, Lawson does not recognize that the Treasury 
Secretary could do more than simply choose among congressionally-mandated penalties. 
247 In certain cases, nonenforcement will be made effectively permanent through the 
operation of an outside force; for example, if the statute of limitations runs in the interim, 
or if the government pledges not to enforce the law against someone in the future through 
a non-prosecution agreement. 
248 See Gordon, supra note __, at 808 ; HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 122 . 
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even if they think ordinary enforcement discretion poses no 
constitutional problem.249 
To be sure, the Treasury Secretary’s power under the 
Remission Act is close enough to enforcement discretion that this 
broad delegation might feel intuitively unobjectionable to modern 
commentators. But members of the Founding generation did not 
justify remission on such grounds. It was a legislative power that 
Congress could apparently grant freely. Accordingly, from an 
orginalist perspective, the Remission Act’s constitutionality must be 
explained some other way. 
B. Permissible Delegation of Legislative Power 
Perhaps instead of viewing remission as a nonlegislative power, 
it was a legislative power that Congress could delegate, but only 
because it qualified under one of several “exceptions” to delegation. 
To be clear, there is no record of anyone in the Founding era 
suggesting that remission was justifiable on such grounds, and no 
nondelegationist argues that now. But the idea is worth exploring 
nonetheless, for if the exceptions cited by nondelegationists are a 
modern invention—as the historical evidence strongly suggests—
then several additional Founding-era statutes also cannot be 
reconciled with a stringent version of the nondelegation doctrine. 
1. Foreign Affairs 
It is common currency among nondelegationists that there was 
an exception to nondelegation for grants of discretionary authority 
touching on military affairs and foreign relations.250 For good 
reason; without such an exception, nondelegationists find it 
difficult—perhaps impossible—to explain several significant 
Founding-era delegations of legislative authority to the executive 
branch.251 Accordingly, they have invoked the exception to justify 
                                                            
249 See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 123 (“[P]rosecutorial discretion … may 
be worrisome, but [administrative] waivers are much worse.”). 
250 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Gordon, supra note __, 782; 
Rappaport, supra note __, at 352-54; David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could 
the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1260 (1985); cf. also HAMBURGER, 
UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 105 (statutory licensing regimes the Founders used for “cross-
border or offshore problems” did not contravene the nondelegation principle). 
251 See Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (early 19th-century embargo 
statute can be explained as “permissible [executive] lawmaking” in the area of foreign 
affairs); American Railroads, 575 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(1794 embargo statute did not violate nondelegation principles because it “involved the 
external relations of the United States”); Cass, supra note __, at 157 (“Outside the realm of 
foreign involved the external relations of the United States affairs … [Congress] did not 
authorize the President or the courts or other governmental officers to adopt rules that 
broadly regulated behavior of private individuals ….”); Gordon, supra note __, at 784-85 
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exceptionally broad grants of authority regarding restrictions on 
foreign commerce252 and trade with Native peoples.253 Such an 
exception might also justify early statutes that nondelegationists 
have not addressed, such as those involving military build-ups254 
and enforcement of quarantines against foreign vessels.255 
The argument in favor of such an exception is seductively 
straightforward. Because Article II of the Constitution grants the 
President “substantial authority” in war and foreign relations, 
delegations in those areas are “already within the scope of executive 
power.”256 In effect, statutes giving the executive broad discretion 
in military and foreign relations are not really delegations of 
legislative authority. They merely confirm power the executive 
already enjoys under the Constitution (if perhaps shared with 
Congress).257 The argument has obvious flaws—most notably, the 
early statutes nondelegationists seek to explain all involve military 
and foreign affairs powers the Constitution expressly grants to 
Congress, not to the President.258 But if we allow that, broadly 
speaking, military and foreign relations are areas of “overlap[ping]” 
legislative and executive authority, a carve-out for delegations in 
this area makes some intuitive sense.259 
A Founding-era nondelegation exception for military and 
foreign affairs cannot explain the Treasury Secretary’s remission 
authority, for two reasons. First, it is difficult to categorize the 
Secretary’s power to remit penalties incurred for violations of the 
                                                            
(a foreign affairs exception is the best way to “harmonize” several early delegations with 
a robust nondelegation doctrine); Rappaport, supra note __, at 352-54 (“tentative[ly]” 
suggesting that early delegations to the executive in military and foreign affairs can be 
explained as an “exception” justified by constitutional structure and purpose). 
252 See Gordon, supra note __, at 784 & n.219 (citing Act of June 4, 1794, 1 Stat. 372; Act 
of March 3, 1795, 2 Stat. 444; Act of June 13, 1798, 1 Stat. 566; Act of February 9, 1799, 
3 Stat. 615). 
253 See Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note __, at 397, 401-02 (citing Act of July 22, 
1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137); Rapport, supra note __, at 354 (same); Wurman, supra note __, 
at 48 (delegation in the Indian Intercourse Act of 1790 can be explained by reference to 
“the President’s treaty and commander-in-chief power”). 
254 See Act of March 5, 1792, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 241, 241-42. 
255 See Act of May 27, 1796, 1 Stat. 474. 
256 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also Schoenbrod, supra note __, 
at 1260 (similar). 
257 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (President 
does not need an act of Congress to act “as the sole organ of the federal government in the 
field of international relations”). 
258 See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8 (granting Congress power to “raise and support armies” and 
“regulate commerce with foreign nations … and with the Indian tribes”). 
259 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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customs laws as a power concerning “foreign relations.” That power 
was related to foreign commerce, in that the customs laws regulated 
imports. But the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate 
foreign commerce, not the President.260 In addition, the early 
remission power extended to penalties incurred for purely domestic 
infractions. For example, the Secretary could remit penalties for 
violations of statutes regulating the “coasting trade”261—i.e., trade 
within United States waters—and statutes prescribing excise taxes 
on spirits.262 
Second, and more importantly, a foreign relations exception to 
nondelegation simply did not exist at the Founding.263 The limited 
evidence nondelegationists cite is actually no support at all. For 
example, nondelegationists rely heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
statement in United States v. Curtiss-Wright that delegations of 
discretion are more permissible with respect to foreign relations.264 
Decided in 1936, Curtiss-Wright is obviously not itself evidence of 
a Founding-era foreign relations exception.265 In upholding a 1934 
congressional resolution granting the President the power to ban 
certain arms sales, the Court discussed Founding-era statutes 
granting the President broad authority to enact or rescind restrictions 
on foreign commerce related to armed conflict.266 In light of this 
“unbroken legislative practice,” the Court had little trouble 
concluding that the 1934 provision was constitutional.267 But the 
fact that a number of early statutes were consistent with a foreign 
relations exception does not make such enactments evidence of such 
an exception. Without indication that such statutes would have been 
                                                            
260 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8; see also Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive 
Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2019) (as an 
originalist matter, the Vesting Clause of Article II does not give the President “a free-
floating and indefeasible foreign affairs power”).  
261 Remission Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 122. 
262 See Spirits Act of 1791, § 43, 1 Stat. 199, 209. 
263 See Note, supra note __, at 1140 (“No one [at the Founding] suggested th[at] delegations 
were permissible solely by virtue of their foreign affairs subject matter.”). 
264 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (“[C]ongressional legislation which is to be made effective 
through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the 
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be 
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.”); see also Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2137 n.42 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Curtiss-Wright as support for foreign relation exception); 
American Railroads, 575 U.S. at 80 n.5 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). 
265 There is also reason to believe that the Curtiss-Wright Court invented the foreign affairs 
exception to justify a delegation that would otherwise have been invalid under the Court’s 
decisions in Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry the year before. See Note, supra note 
__, at 1149-51. 
266 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322-24. 
267 Id. at 322. 
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prohibited but for their connection to foreign relations, their 
existence is just as consistent with a permissive Founding-era 
understanding of nondelegation generally.268 
The other evidence cited by nondelegationists is no more 
probative of a foreign affairs exception. A 1790 statement by a 
member of Congress, 269 an 1803 treatise passage,270  and an 1808 
district court opinion are not actually about delegation.271 An 1829 
treatise passage—published forty years after ratification—does 
suggest that Congress can more broadly delegate in the realm of 
foreign affairs.272 But the writer was not, as one scholar asserts, 
                                                            
268 Indeed, Phillip Hamburger concedes that several Founding-era embargo statutes 
violated nondelegation principles by empowering the President to do more than “merely 
determine facts” that would allow commercial restrictions to go into effect. See 
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 108-09 & n.48 (noting 1794, 1799, 1800, and 
1808 statutes). Hamburger does not justify these statutes on the basis of a foreign relations 
exception. Instead, he argues that, because later embargo statutes (in 1809 and 1810) 
granted the President less discretion, Congress had “recognized the constitutional problem” 
with its earlier delegations, and fixed it. Id. at 109 & n.51. But it not only took Congress 
twenty years to realize that its actions were unconstitutional; on Hamburger’s telling, 
Congress continued to delegate broad authority to the President to limit foreign commerce 
after it had supposedly seen the errors of its ways. See id. (noting congressional “lapse” in 
1822, among others). 
269 See Gordon, supra note __, at 784-85. The 1790 statement arose in a debate over 
whether Congress could statutorily require the President to seek the Senate’s consent when 
setting compensation for American diplomatic officials out of appropriated funds. See 12 
DHFFC 71-72. In other words, the discussion was not about whether Congress could more 
broadly grant legislative authority to the executive when “foreign relations” were involved. 
It was about whether Congress could limit the President’s Article II authority to direct U.S. 
diplomacy. See 12 DHFFC 72 (“[I]ntercourse with foreign nations is a trust specially 
committed to the President of the United States; and after the Legislature has made the 
necessary provision to enable him to discharge that trust, the manner how it shall be 
executed must rest with him.”). 
270 See Gordon, supra note __, at 784-85. The passage from St. George Tucker’s edition of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries says nothing about delegations of legislative authority. As 
Tucker makes very clear, he was discussing a 1793 controversy over whether, by 
announcing that the United States would remain neutral in the growing war between France 
and Great Britain, President Washington had improperly exercised the power to “declare 
war” granted to Congress under Art. I, § 8, cl. 11. See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 346-47 & n. (1803). This dispute was not about delegation, 
as Congress had not legislated at all.  
271 See Gordon, supra note __, at 784-85. The 1808 opinion regarding the constitutionality 
of the Jeffersonian embargo was not about whether Congress can permissibly delegate 
authority to the President to suspend the embargo. The court mentioned the President’s 
power to suspend the embargo only once, in passing. United States v. the William, 28 F. 
Cas. 614, 622 (D. Mass. 1808). The constitutional issue the court discussed was whether 
Congress had the power under Article I to institute such broad restrictions on foreign 
commerce in the first place. See id. at 620-24 (“It is contended, that congress is not invested 
with powers, by the constitution, to enact laws, so general and so unlimited, relative to 
commercial intercourse with foreign nations, as those now under consideration.”).  
272 See RAWLE, supra note __, at 196 (“Among other incidents arising from foreign 
relations, it may be noticed that congress, which cannot conveniently be always in session, 
may devolve on the president, duties that at first view seem to belong only to themselves.”). 
45 
“reflecting on the first few decades under the Constitution.”273 
Instead, he was discussing an 1813 decision of the Supreme Court 
that did not discuss a foreign relations exception to nondelegation; 
indeed, it did not directly address delegation at all.274 
Just as importantly, there is also strong evidence against a 
foreign affairs exception to nondelegation. On multiple occasions in 
the first two decades following Ratification, federal legislators 
argued that legislation giving the executive broad discretion related 
to military and foreign affairs violated nondelegation principles.275 
For example, the 1798 Alien Act empowered the President to order 
the removal of any foreign citizen he deemed “dangerous to the 
peace and safety of the United States.”276 Other proposed legislation 
that year authorized him to raise an army of up to 20,000 troops 
“whenever he shall judge the public safety shall require the 
measure.”277 An 1808 law allowed the President to suspend a 
statutory embargo on foreign commerce whenever he concluded that 
the actions of warring European powers “render[ed] the United 
States sufficiently safe.”278 An 1810 proposal would have given the 
                                                            
273 Gordon, supra note __, at 786. 
274 See RAWLE, supra note __, at 196 n.*. In The Brig Aurora, the owner of cargo seized 
for alleged violation of an 1810 law that empowered the President to put an embargo into 
effect if he determined that France or Great Britain was violating United States neutrality 
by seizing American ships. The owner argued that Congress could not give the President 
the power to put the embargo into effect. In response, the attorney for the government 
argued that Congress had not “transfer[red] any power of legislation to the President.” It 
had only empowered him to determine, as a factual matter, whether the warring powers 
were violating United States neutrality. The Court did not address the issue directly. All it 
said was that it could “see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its 
discretion in reviving the act … either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should 
direct.” The Aurora, 11 U.S. 382, 388 (1813).  
275 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-
1801, at 186-87 (1997) (1794 bill allowing the President to decide the size of the army); 
id. 244-48 (1798 bill authorizing to the President to raise an additional volunteer military 
force); supra notes __ and ___ accompanying text (1797 Remission Act reauthorization); 
Gordon, supra note __, at 747-48 (1798 bill empowering the President to order the removal 
of aliens); id. 748-49 (1810 bill given the President standardless authority to deploy naval 
ships to “protect the commerce of the United States”); HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 
__, at 107 (1808 bill allowing the President to suspend a statutory embargo on foreign 
commerce) see generally Note, supra note __, at 1140-46. 
276 An Act Concerning Aliens, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798); see also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2007-
08 (1798) (Livingston) (arguing the Act unconstitutionally combined “legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers”). 
277 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1631; see also id. at 1538 (Gallatin) (arguing that the bill 
“improper[ly] … vested Legislative power in the President of the United States.”); 
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 116-19 (reviewing debate over the bill). 
278 Embargo Act of 1808, 2 Stat. 490; see also 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 2118 (Key) (“We 
cannot transfer the power of legislating from ourselves to the president ….”).  
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President apparently standardless authority to deploy naval ships to 
“protect the commerce of the United States.”279 
Notably, in no case did proponents of the proposed legislation 
defend it on grounds of a delegation exception for military and 
foreign affairs. This is puzzling, to say the least. If this exception 
was “well-established” at the Founding,280 why was it never invoked 
to defend these bills’ constitutionality? For that matter, why did 
members of Congress persist in decrying as unconstitutional such 
legislative grants of authority for two decades after Ratification, if 
that was universally understood to be a losing argument? If it was 
consensus in the Founding era that Congress has significant latitude 
to delegate in the realms of military and foreign affairs, it seems odd 
that no one in Congress thought this was worth mentioning. 
The obvious solution to this puzzle is that such an exception to 
nondelegation did not exist. Indeed, it is not all clear that Founding-
era Americans would have understood “foreign affairs” to constitute 
a distinct category of legislative authority in the first place. In an era 
when constant international armed conflict threatened the nation’s 
commerce and security (as well as providing opportunities for 
American aggrandizement), concern over foreign relations impacted 
virtually all “domestic” policymaking.281 The foreign affairs 
exception to the nondelegation principle is almost certainly a 
modern invention—either by the Curtiss-Wright Court in 1936, or 
by originalist scholars seeking to explain how a Founding 
generation committed to stringent limits on delegation could have 
repeatedly sanctioned broad grants of authority to the executive. 
Perhaps a military and foreign affairs exception to nondelegation 
makes sense on structural or functional grounds.282 But it is difficult 
to justify as an originalist matter. 
2. Benefits 
Remission also cannot be explained by resort to a second 
exceptional category nondelegationists identify: one for delegations 
relating to government privileges and benefits. Under this theory, a 
                                                            
279 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 2022 (1810); see also id. (Jackson) (“All legislative power is by 
the Constitution vested in Congress. They cannot transfer it.”). 
280 Gordon, Rebuttal, supra note __, at 33. 
281 See BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL 
AUTHORITY IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA 155-56 (2009) (“With borders shifting daily and 
trade subjected to the whims of powerful nations that dominated the sea lanes, the 
distinction between domestic and foreign policy was meaningless.”); Parrillo, Critical 
Assessment, supra note __, at 19-20 (1798 federal land tax prompted by need to finance 
military preparations for war with France). 
282  See Rappaport, supra note __, at 352-54. 
47 
legislative delegation is unconstitutional only when the rules issued 
by the executive pursuant to the delegation “bind” or “constrain” 
individuals. Rules that merely regulate the provision of privileges 
and benefits do not have such “binding” force, and therefore can 
lawfully be created by the executive.283 In deeming unconstitutional 
most executive-issued rules “governing private conduct,” Justice 
Gorsuch appear to subscribe to this theory.284 Again for good reason, 
as a constraints/benefits distinction helps nondelegationists make 
sense of several early federal statutes that otherwise appear to 
violate nondelegation principles.285 
As an originalist explanation for the Remission Act, this theory 
suffers from similar flaws as the foreign relations exception. First, 
leaving aside the fact that no one in Congress justified the Act on 
such grounds, it seems doubtful whether a privileges exception 
actually existed at all. Its proponents cite no Founding-era evidence 
indicating such an exception.286 And again, early legislation that 
seemingly would have qualified as regulating “benefits” was 
attacked by opponents on nondelegation grounds.287 For example, 
in a 1791 episode often cited by nondelegationists as evidence of a 
robust Founding-era principle,288 James Madison and others 
criticized as unconstitutional a proposal that would have given the 
President broad discretion to designate “post roads” along which the 
mails would run.289 If there had been a consensus view that Congress 
                                                            
283 See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 3 n.*, 84-85. 
284 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also Bamzai, supra note __, at 
182 (“A distinction between rights and privileges might explain several laws enacted in 
early Congresses that delegated authority to the executive branch ….”); Wurman, supra 
note __, at 52 (“Perhaps Congress had more power to delegate authority to establish public 
privileges.”). 
285 See HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 86 (1790 act empowering the President 
to set rates for military pensions); Bamzai, supra note __, at 182 (1790 act allowing 
executive branch to license and regulate trade with Indian tribes); id. (1790 act authorizing 
executive officials to issue patents); cf. also Joseph Postell & Paul D. Moreno, Not Dead 
Yet - Or Never Born - The Reality of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 3 CONST. STUD. 41, 47 
(2018) (asserting that most Founding-era delegations resulted in executive regulations that 
“‘did not bind’” the public).  
286 See American Railroads, 575 U.S. at 83 n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(discussing United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911)); Bamzai, supra note __, at 178 
(identifying Grimaud as “the key precedent” supporting a rights/privilege distinction for 
nondelegation); HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 84-85 (citing only John Locke 
and Edward Coke). 
287 See Parrillo, Supplemental Paper, supra note __, at 19-20. 
288 See Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note __, at 402-03; JOSEPH POSTELL, 
BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 75-77 (2017); Wurman, supra note __, at 14-20. 
289 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 97-106. I discuss the “post roads debate” at 
greater length in Part IV.B. 
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could broadly delegate legislative authority to the executive when 
“privileges” were at issue, Madison’s nondelegation critique would 
have been pointless. And the proposal’s supporters would likely 
have invoked the exception, instead of defending the proposal on the 
ground they actually did—that Congress generally had the authority 
to make such an expansive delegation.290 
Moreover, even if a benefits exception did exist at the 
Founding, the Remission Act is an awkward fit. Formally, it might 
make sense; the Act assumed that a penalty has already been 
“incurred,”291 so one can view remission granted by the Treasury 
Secretary as merely bestowing upon the petitioner a government 
“benefit” to which he has no legal right. But that is not how 
remission worked in the real world. As described above, the 
remission mechanism was effectively an alternative, executive 
branch procedure for adjudicating cases involving customs 
violations.292 When someone filed a petition seeking remission, no 
actual penalty was decided upon or imposed until the Treasury 
Secretary made his decision. 
The difficulty of cleanly categorizing remission as a “benefit” 
also illustrates the larger problem with the constraint/benefit 
distinction. As its leading proponent, Phillip Hamburger, 
acknowledges, some denials of benefits “operate in the manner of a 
constraint,” and should be treated as such for constitutional 
purposes.293 Though Hamburger does not offer a way of 
distinguishing “pure” benefits from “benefits-as-constraints,” it 
seems safe to assume that a benefit that was, in reality, a penalty 
imposed for violating the law would count as a “constraint.”294  
                                                            
290 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 232 (Bourne) (“The Constitution meant no more than that 
Congress should possess the exclusive right of doing that, by themselves or by any other 
person, which amounts to the same thing.”). 
291 Remission Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 122; see also United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. 246, 291 
(1825) (the Remission Act “presupposes[] that the offence has been committed,” and 
simply “affords relief for … unintentional error”).  
292 See supra notes __ to __ and accompanying text. 
293 HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 3 n.* (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254 (1970), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976)); see also Harold J. Krent, 
Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 732 (1994) (noting the “difficulty” 
of distinguishing “rules of private conduct from those merely affecting or encouraging 
private conduct”). 
294 Indeed, Hamburger later argues that, in the English tradition, laws that “obliged”—i.e., 
that coerced—“included those that relaxed legal duties.” HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra 
note __, at 84 (emphasis added). On his account, any executive “alteration of a legally 
binding duty” was “unlawful.” Id. 
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Accordingly, the Remission Act should have run afoul of the 
Founding-era nondelegation doctrine that Hamburger and others 
espouse. But it did not. Nor did other examples of Founding-era 
“benefits” legislation that delegated broad policymaking power to 
the executive. For example, a 1790 statute gave the President 
unfettered authority to prescribe regulations governing licenses 
given to persons who wanted to trade with Native peoples. Because 
such trading was prohibited without a license, the statute clearly 
allowed the executive to impose “constraints.”295 So to with the 
Patent Act of 1790, which empowered executive branch officials to 
issue patents granting “inventors the exclusive right to their … 
discoveries”—i.e., the executive could “constrain” people from 
engaging in conduct the patent covered.296 In short, on multiple 
occasions the early Congresses gave the executive branch broad 
authority to regulate the provision of “benefits” in ways that actually 
placed meaningful limits on private conduct.  
3. Unimportance 
A third possibility for explaining the Remission Act is that 
Congress simply thought remission was not that important. Taking 
their cue from an opinion authored by Chief Justice Marshall in 
1825, nondelegationists like Gary Lawson and Ilan Wurman have 
suggested that Congress cannot delegate authority over “important 
subjects,” but it can over matters of “less interest.”297 Justice 
Gorsuch echoed this view in Gundy, when he allowed that the 
executive branch can “fill up the details” of a regulatory scheme, as 
long as Congress has made the key “policy decisions” first.298 
                                                            
295 Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137; see also Wurman, supra note __, at 39 (“This was 
indeed a broad statute that delegated authority to regulate private conduct.”). 
296 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (emphasis added). Hamburger argues that patents were 
historically not considered “binding,” because the patent only prevented other people from 
engaging in conduct the patent covered; otherwise, they could do what they liked. 
HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note __, at 201-02. Of course, the fact that a patent only 
partially constrained others does not mean is not a “constraint,” and Hamburger admits 
that the distinction is “artificial.” Id; cf. also Wurman, supra note __, at (noting that rules 
created by the executive branch under the Patent Act “would alter the rights of private 
persons”). 
297 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1825); see Lawson Original Meaning 376-77 
(“Congress must make the central, fundamental decisions, but Congress can leave ancillary 
matters to the President or the courts.”); Wurman, supra note __, at 7 (“[T]he picture the 
founding-era history paints is one of a nondelegation doctrine whereby Congress could not 
delegate to the Executive decisions over ‘important subjects’ ….”). 
298 Gundy, 139 S.Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Paul v. United States, 140 S.Ct.  342, 
342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.) (“[M]ajor national policy decisions must be made by Congress 
and the President in the legislative process, not delegated by Congress to the Executive 
Branch”). 
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As a theory of nondelegation, an “important subjects” approach 
makes some sense. If we assume there was some Founding-era limit 
on Congress’s power to delegate legislative authority, requiring 
Congress to make “important” policy decisions before delegating 
“details” to the executive is at least consistent with constitutional 
separation of powers principles.299 If nothing else, an important-
subjects theory of nondelegation seems more plausible than a 
general prohibition on delegation riddled with various subject-
matter exceptions. 
Yet this approach, too, is fraught with difficulty. The first 
problem is conceptual (and obvious): “Importance” is very much in 
the eye of the beholder.300 As recognized by Chief Justice Marshall 
and modern scholars on all sides of the debate, distinguishing 
important “policy decisions” from unimportant “details” in a 
principled, consistent way is challenging, to the say the least.301 
Wurman, for example, offers no criteria for drawing such a line.302  
He suggests that the important/unimportant dichotomy mirrors the 
distinction he advances between “exclusive” and “nonexclusive” 
legislative powers—i.e., Congress has “exclusive” (and 
nondelegable) authority to decide important policy questions, but 
can give the executive the “nonexclusive” power to specify 
unimportant details in a legislative scheme. But Wurman offers no 
more guidance in distinguishing “exclusive” from “nonexclusive” 
legislative powers than he does in separating important subjects 
from unimportant details. And Lawson concedes that his 
approach—which relies on an analogy to the law of agency—does 
                                                            
299 See Wurman, supra note __, at 24. 
300 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 20 (an important-subject theory “would 
force courts to make subjective and contestable judgments about what counts as a detail 
and what counts as something more”); cf. Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1933, 1982-1990 (2017) (critiquing on similar grounds the “major 
questions” exception to Chevron deference). 
301 See Wayman, 23 U.S. at 43 (“The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those 
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of 
less interest ….”); Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note __, at 361 (“Surely … the 
constitutionality of legislative authorizations to executive and judicial actors cannot turn 
on something as ephemeral, and ultimately circular, as a distinction between ‘important 
subjects’ and matters of ‘less interest.’”); Wurman, supra note __, at 1 (“What are the 
important policies that must be resolved by Congress are sometimes, of course, in the eye 
of the beholder.”); cf. also Sunstein, supra note __, at 326-27 (“The real question is: How 
much executive discretion is too much to count as ‘executive’? No metric is easily available 
to answer that question.”). 
302 Wurman does suggest that Congress has more latitude in delegating “important” matters 
involving public rights than private rights. As discussed earlier, that distinction, too, is 
historically unjustified and conceptually problematic. See supra Part III.B.2. In any event, 
it offers no guidance for resolving the first-order question of whether the matter delegated 
to the executive is “important” or not. 
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not “yield a crisp line … between what is important and what is of 
less interest.”303 
The second problem is historical (and less obvious): As 
intuitively appealing as the important subjects theory may be, it does 
not appear to be one to which members of the Founding generation 
subscribed. The secondary literature reports no instance of 
nondelegation discussed in “importance” terms before Justice 
Marshall’s statement in Wayman—which he made more than three 
decades after Ratification.304 In his recent article, Wurman 
repeatedly asserts that particular Founding-era delegations are 
“consistent” with an important-subjects theory, but does not point to 
evidence that anyone at the Founding articulated such a theory.305 
For his part, Lawson argues that an important-subjects theory 
grounded in agency law is part of the Constitution’s original 
meaning, but that proposition relies on Lawson’s more general—
and contestable—belief that the Constitution itself was understood 
at the Founding to be a sort of fiduciary instrument.306 Accordingly, 
while an important subjects theory of nondelegation might be 
sensible, it does not appear that anyone at the Founding actually 
articulated it. 
In fact, Congress’s early legislative record suggests that 
delegation of important questions to the executive was entirely 
permissible. The Remission Act itself is a good example. As 
discussed earlier, there was broad agreement in Congress that the 
remission power was “important,” in two senses: It was crucial for 
ensuring that innocent lawbreakers were not subject to harsh 
                                                            
303 Lawson, Private-Law Framework, supra note __, at 26. In terms of concrete guidance, 
Lawson advances only the “tentative” suggestion that congressional delegation may be 
more permissible on questions that do not require “national uniformity,” such that “local 
knowledge” available only to executive branch officials might be needed in order to fashion 
policy. Id. at 27-28. 
304 During the post roads debate, one representative who voiced nondelegation objections 
to the proposed grant of discretion to the executive suggested that the establishment of post 
roads was “a very important object,” though it is not clear that, in his view, the roads’ 
importance was what made the delegation unconstitutional. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 229, 230 
(Livermore); see also Wurman, supra note __, at 14-20.  
305 Wurman, supra note __, at 57. 
306 See Lawson, Private-Law Framework, supra note __, at 11 (“[T]he real ground for the 
Constitution’s nonsubdelegation principle is the nature of the Constitution as a particular 
kind of [fiduciary] legal instrument.”). See generally GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A 
GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017). But 
see Richard Primus, The Elephant Problem, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373 (2019) (“As a 
historical matter, there is virtually no evidence that the Founders thought of the 
Constitution on the model of a power of attorney.”); Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, 
Against Fiduciary Constitutionalism, 106 VA. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (2020) (“[T]he 
historical, philosophical, and legal foundations of fiduciary constitutionalism are weak.”). 
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penalties, and also had to be employed carefully, so as not to 
undermine revenue collection—itself a critical matter.307 As Joseph 
Story wrote in 1815, the remission power was understood to be “one 
of the most important and extensive powers” the government 
possessed.308 Little wonder that none of the Act’s proponents 
justified it based on of lack of importance.  
Other examples abound. In 1790, Congress granted the 
President broad discretion to borrow up to $12 million dollars from 
foreign lenders—a sum that, as a percentage of GDP, would be the 
equivalent of more than a trillion dollars today.309 In 1794, it 
authorized the President to impose a complete embargo on foreign 
trade “whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so 
require.”310 In 1798, it enacted a real estate tax of up to $2 million 
that gave executive branch officials broad latitude to decide how the 
tax burden would be distributed within states.311 The list goes on.312 
One might argue that these delegations did not contravene an 
“important subjects” theory, because Congress decided all the really 
important matters. For instance, Wurman suggests that, by capping 
the borrowing and tax power discussed above, Congress left only 
minor matters to executive discretion,313 and he justifies numerous 
other early delegations on similar grounds.314 One could say the 
same about the Remission Act—Congress set the upper limit on 
penalties, and set forth a standard for determining who qualified for 
remission. Perhaps the Treasury Secretary’s discretion to decide 
what penalty to impose on lawbreakers was simply an 
“unimportant” detail that could constitutionally be left to the 
executive branch.  
Such arguments, however, only put us back to square one: How 
do we distinguish between important matters Congress must decide 
and unimportant details it can delegate? Maybe proponents of this 
theory will flesh it out in ways that render it judicially administrable. 
But as an originalist matter, the absence of historical evidence in its 
favor offers no good reason for the Supreme Court to abandon its 
                                                            
307 See supra notes __ to __ and accompanying text. 
308 The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 720–21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). 
309 See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, 1 Stat. 138, 139; Chabot, supra note __, at 26-27. 
310 See Act of June 4, 1794, § 1, 1 Stat. 372, 372; Note, supra note __, at 1141-42. 
311 See Parrillo, Critical Assessment, supra note __, at 21-24. 
312 See generally Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 76-96. 
313 See Wurman, supra note __, at 49-54. 
314 See, e.g., Wurman, supra note __, at 45-46 (pensions); id. at 48 (naturalization); id. at 
52-53 (patents), 
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longstanding “intelligible principle” test in favor of such an elusive 
approach to delegation. 
4. Necessity 
Finally, there is the possibility of necessity: Congress had to 
delegate certain functions—including remission—to the executive, 
because it could not feasibly perform those tasks itself. Again, the 
theory is plausible. It would be absurdly self-defeating to prohibit 
Congress from delegating essential tasks it cannot itself perform, 
and the Constitution, we know, is not “a suicide pact.”315 Indeed, the 
Court’s historically permissive approach to delegation has been 
shaped by a recognition that any limit on Congress’s power to 
delegate must take into account “common sense and the inherent 
necessities of the governmental co-ordination.”316 As the Court 
explained in Mistretta v. United States, “in our increasingly complex 
society … Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to 
delegate power under broad general directives.”317 
If “necessity” as the touchstone of delegation makes intuitive 
sense, as a standard for distinguishing between permissible and 
impermissible delegations it suffers from the same problems as an 
“important subjects” theory. First, there is little evidence members 
of the Founding generation framed delegation in these terms. It 
certainly was not present in debates over the Remission Act. While 
members of Congress generally agreed that the remission power 
itself was essential, no one argued that Congress had to delegate that 
power to the executive branch.318 
Evidence that “necessity” was a core concept in Founding-era 
views about delegation is lacking more generally, too. Gary Lawson 
and Christine Chabot both rely on a 1791 comment by James 
Madison suggesting that departures from nondelegation orthodoxy 
might be justified on such grounds.319 But others in the same debate 
                                                            
315 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). But see 
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE 
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 173 (1993) (the supposed necessity of delegation does not 
excuse constitutional violations). 
316 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). 
317 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Am. Power & Light Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (“Necessity therefore fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable 
and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules ….”). 
318 See supra Part II.A. 
319 See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 238-39 (Madison) (“[T]here did not appear to be any necessity 
for alienating the powers of the House; and that if this should take place, it would be a 
violation of the Constitution.”); Chabot, supra note __, at 40-43 (extrapolating a 
“necessity” test for delegation from Madison’s statement); Lawson, Private-Law 
Framework, supra note __, at 35-37 (similar). 
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rejected the idea,320 and it appears that arguments from necessity 
otherwise did not appear in Founding-era discussions. Ilan Wurman 
suggests in passing that several early delegations were 
constitutionally permissible because “[i]t is difficult to imagine what 
more Congress could have been expected to do.”321 But Wurman 
does not embrace “necessity” as a defining characteristic of an 
original nondelegation principle, let alone offer evidence that it was. 
As a result, any originalist effort to replace the Court’s longstanding 
“intelligible principle” test with a more stringent “necessity” 
argument would seem to fail, at minimum, for lack of proof.322 
Second, a “necessity” standard for delegation raises the same 
subjectivity problems that flow from an “important subjects” theory. 
The Remission Act again offers a telling example. Congress 
certainly had the ability to handle remission petitions itself; it did so 
both before the Act’s passage and after,323 and did the same with 
thousands of others.324 Yet as I discuss below, Congress may have 
delegated the remission power to the Treasury Secretary because 
doing so would free the legislature to focus on other matters.325 So 
to determine whether it was “necessary” for Congress to delegate 
the remission power, we first have to have a more general opinion 
about how the early Congress should have spent its limited time.326 
Thus even if a “necessity” exception to nondelegation was 
historically justified, it offers little help in distinguishing 
permissible from impermissible delegations. 
                                                            
320 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 239 (1791) (Sedgwick) (“A supposed necessity could not 
justify the infraction of a Constitution which the members were under every obligation of 
duty and their oaths, solemnly pledged, to support.”) 
321 Wurman, supra note __, at 47-48; see also id. 49, 50. 
322 To be clear, neither Chabot nor Lawson argue that a “necessity” standard would tighten 
the “intelligible principle” test, let alone replace it. For Chabot, the two principles are 
entirely consistent, given the Court’s repeated reference to necessity concerns in 
reaffirming its longstanding test. See Chabot, supra note __, at 44. For Lawson, arguments 
about necessity—which he believes are consistent with an original fiduciary understanding 
of the Constitution—simply collapse into first-order disputes over what tasks Congress 
should undertake in the first place. See Lawson, Private-Law Framework, supra note __, 
at 37-39 (“If Congress’s ‘job’ is indeed to micro-manage the entirety of American society, 
there is at least a serious argument that massive subdelegation can be justified by even a 
strict Madisonian understanding of necessity.”); cf. HAMBURGER, UNLAWFUL, supra note 
__, at 420-22 (in the modern administrative state, alleged “necessity” is a constant 
condition).  
323 See supra notes __ to __ and accompanying text. 
324 See McKinley, supra note __, at 1573-74, 1590. 
325 See infra Part IV.A. 
326 See Lawson, Private-Law Framework, supra note __, at 39 (the “necessity” argument 
the Court makes in Mistretta presumes that Congress’s “job” “involves … a massive 
overseeing of everybody’s lives, fortunes, and sacred honors”). 
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* * * 
In the end, none of the various distinctions nondelegationsists 
have proposed can explain why a number of early delegations—
including the Remission Act—did not run afoul of the robust limits 
on legislative grants of power that supposedly inhere in the 
Constitution. The most sensible conclusion is that, in the Founding 
era, such limits did not exist. 
IV. DELEGATION AND IMPROVISATION AT THE FOUNDING 
If the Remission Act and other early federal legislation point to 
a permissive view of delegation at the Founding, a question remains: 
Why did Congress repeatedly delegate broad authority to the 
executive branch? The answer may not matter much for arguments 
over the original understanding of Congress’s power to delegate. In 
evidentiary terms, what counts most is the delegations themselves, 
and what they tell us about what the Founding generation thought 
about constitutional limits (or lack thereof) on Congress’s ability to 
give legislative power to the executive. 
That said, there is value in stepping back and considering more 
broadly why Congress structured powers like remission the way it 
did. If nothing else, trying to get a glimpse of legislative motivations 
can explain how the Founding generation could have routinely 
tolerated broad delegations of legislative authority under a 
Constitution predicted on separation of powers. 
The simple—if perhaps inelegant—answer is that granting 
broad policymaking discretion to the executive branch was often the 
least-worst way to balance competing legislative priorities. As Part 
IV.A shows, the Remission Act offers a telling example. After 
considering and debating a number of different institutional 
mechanisms through which the federal government could moderate 
the potentially harsh effects of customs-related penalties, Congress 
settled on broad discretion vested in the Treasury Secretary. Not 
because that was obviously the correct—or constitutionally 
acceptable—choice, but because it was the best among imperfect 
options. 
More importantly, the architects of early federal authority 
discussed the possibilities largely in the language of governmental 
efficiency, not constitutional limitation. As Part IV.B discusses, this 
was a pattern repeated across the domains of federal authority, as 
Congress struggled to devise new solutions to the myriad problems 
of national governance. Indeed, attending to the early period’s 
administrative dynamism helps make sense of two additional 
examples of delegation that figure prominently in the originalist 
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literature. Whatever nondelegation principle the architects of the 
early remission power may have thought inhered in the Constitution, 
it did not appear to shape their choices about how to design a 
functional administrative system. 
A. Delegating to the Executive 
So why did Congress give its authority to remit penalties to the 
Treasury Secretary? Though the evidence is circumstantial, the 
historical records reveal several possibilities.  
One is that Congress valued the consistency that executive 
resolution offered. Recall that, under the original House proposal, 
the Remission Act would have assigned authority to local federal 
officials, including district judges. But later versions of the bill 
shifted authority to the executive branch, first to a three-member 
panel of cabinet officers, and then to the Treasury Secretary alone.327 
This change met objections; several members were concerned that 
centralized decision-making would slow the delivery of warranted 
relief, and operate to advantage of merchants located near seat of 
government.328 Yet Congress apparently concluded that the “strict 
justice”329 that a single decision maker would provide would “more 
effectually … secure the revenue.”330 
Indeed, Fisher Ames, the Act’s chief proponent, doubted 
whether Congress was equal to the task of ruling on remission 
petitions consistently. In responding to Edward Livingston’s 
argument that Congress could not constitutionally delegate the 
remission power, Ames questioned whether a “popular body” could 
produce “anything like system” in this area.331 He may have had 
good reasons for his doubts. The House’s procedural mechanisms 
for responding to petitions might have enabled it to rule consistently 
with past decisions.332 But any action in favor of a petitioner was 
                                                            
327 See supra Part II.B. 
328 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1475 (Goodhue) (petitioners far from the national capital would 
suffer from delay); 12 DHFFC 845 (Sherman) (“The amendment made by the Senate will 
cause some delays.”); id. at 846 (Jackson) (“The people who [are] referred to the Secretary 
of the Treasury [will be] dragged over to New York to be tried.”); id. (Smith) (“The distant 
inhabitants will lose all possible relief. This amendment seems calculated for the 
(merchants) of this city.”); id. 847 (remission “[o]ught to be determined in the state where 
[the offense] happens”). 
329 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1474 (Sherman); see also 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames) 
(rejecting option of making customs laws “loosely,” and giving “considerable discretion” 
to front-line officers in execution). . 
330 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1474 (Sherman). 
331 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288 (Ames). 
332 See McKinley, supra note __, at 1561-62 (discussing regularized House procedures for 
responding to petitions, including standing committees for particular subject areas). 
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subject to approval by the entire legislature.333 The Secretary also 
had an expertise advantage. As one representative argued very early 
in the debates, the Secretary’s “general superintendence” over the 
customs system meant that he was particularly well-informed about 
its operation, and was therefore best-positioned to “establish a 
uniform rule” regarding remission.334 And as discussed earlier, it 
appears that the early Secretaries in fact did exercise their power in 
predictable and consistent ways.335 
A second possibility is neutrality. Ames, in particular, worried 
that legislative politics would have a distorting effect on remission 
decisions. In his view, it would be impossible for Congress to decide 
on petitions free of the influence of “local sympathy.”336 Every 
representative would feel obliged to advocate on behalf of 
constituents seeking relief,337 which would “dirty their fingers”338 
and produce unfortunate “precedent[s]” that subsequent petitioners 
could invoke to support their suspect claims.339  
In contrast, Ames thought executive branch officers were 
insulated from political pressure.340 They owed “responsibility” to 
Congress—and the nation—as a whole, a fact that would help 
ensure “proper conduct” in using the remission power.341 Or as 
another representative asserted, the Treasury Secretary was 
“naturally … bias[ed]” in favor of augmenting federal revenue, so 
there was “no danger” in placing the remission power in his 
hands.342 Not everyone agreed—Edward Livingston thought that a 
single decision-maker would be more likely to be influenced by 
wealthy and powerful merchants seeking to use the system to their 
advantage.343 But at minimum it seems that the promise of 
administrative neutrality may have encouraged Congress to delegate 
remission to the Treasury Secretary. 
                                                            
333 McKinley, supra note __, at 1549 n.34. 
334 12 DHFFC 10 (Boudinot). 
335 See supra Part III.A.1. 
336 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames). 
337 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288 (Ames) (“[I]f one of his constituents were to come to him 
and request relief, he should find himself necessarily interested in his behalf.”) 
338 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288 (Ames). 
339 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames). 
340 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2286 (Ames) (delegating the remission power to “Executive 
Officers” would prevent the influence of “local sympathy” from affecting decisions). 
341 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2288 (Ames). 
342 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (Sitgreaves). 
343 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2289 (Livingston) (“[I]t was certainly more difficult to 
influence several men than one man.”). 
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There is also a third, more prosaic explanation for why 
Congress delegated the remission power. It wanted to relieve itself 
of the burden of responding to petitions. Hamilton suggested as 
much in his 1790 proposal: Vesting remission authority outside 
Congress would avoid the “inconvenience of a Legislative 
Decision” on individual applications.344 At least one member of 
Congress agreed; if the House did not divert petitions somewhere 
else, it would be “consumed in local concerns,” unable to focus on 
“promoting the public good.”345 The problem remained when 
Congress expanded the Secretary’s power seven years later; 
delegating authority over more pleas for relief was required to rid 
the House of petitions that continued to “engage [its] attention every 
session.”346 As one representative bluntly warned, if legislators were 
obliged to dispose of such petitions, “they might sit the whole year 
round about subjects worse than nothing.”347 
In the end, the best answer to the question of why Congress 
delegated such broad authority to the Treasury Secretary might be 
“all of the above.” That is, there was no single reason for the 
decision; representatives who supported the Remission Act did so 
for a variety of reasons. Nor was the delegation to the Secretary the 
obvious choice. Each of the possible configurations of the remission 
power involved tradeoffs among important values: consistency, 
expertise, neutrality, capacity. Granting authority to the Treasury 
Secretary was simply the best—or least-worst—of several imperfect 
solutions. As one representative put it, the legislature initially gave 
remission to the Secretary because “[n]o better mode could then be 
thought of.”348  
Reflecting this administrative ambivalence, Congress made the 
Act temporary, and did not make it permanent for another decade.349 
It considered other configurations in the meantime.350 Little wonder 
                                                            
344 Saddler Report, supra note __. 
345 12 DHFFC 11 (Boudinot). 
346 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (Livingston); see also 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2285 (Sitgreaves) 
(the 1797 act extended the Treasury Secretary’s remission power to violations of statutory 
requirements regarding vessel licensing and registration was because “the time of the 
House had been considerably occupied by petitions for remissions of forfeitures”) 
347 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1789 (unattributed).  
348 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (Coit). 
349 See supra Part II.C. 
350 For example, an early version of a 1791 act regulating distilled spirits provided for 
remission of penalties by the district court judge, with an appeal to the Supreme Court 
available in cases worth $500 or more. Enclosure: [An Act Repealing Duties Laid Upon 
Distilled Spirits Imported], [9 January 1790], https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Hamilton/01-06-02-0076-0002-0013. The final version of the act gave remission authority 
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that, when critics in 1797 fretted about the danger of concentrating 
so much power in one person’s hands, one defender responded with 
a rhetorical shrug: However “extraordinary” the remission power 
was, the Secretary had been exercising it for years, and “no material 
inconvenience had arisen.”351 In other words, what cemented 
executive-branch remission into the permanent architecture of 
federal law enforcement was not a grand theory about the relative 
domains of legislative and executive authority. It was the simple fact 
that the Act worked well enough. 
Importantly, whatever members of Congress thought of the 
merits of particular institutional arrangements, they did not think 
that the Constitution meaningfully constrained their options. As 
discussed earlier, opponents of the Remission Act made only a 
handful of half-hearted arguments that it was unconstitutional, and 
just one based on nondelegation principles.352 Congress apparently 
felt free to propose and debate delegations to different actors in 
nonconstitutional terms. It adopted an approach expressly modeled 
on British practice, even though the Founding generation’s alleged 
distrust of delegation was—according to nondelegationists—a 
reaction against the British constitution’s permissiveness in this 
regard.353 
Remission’s improvisational foundations become even more 
evident when viewed within the broader framework of the customs 
laws more generally. Much of the legislation Congress wrote in this 
area was highly detailed, specifying everything from the precise 
duties on rum, steel, and salt354 to the size of the containers in which 
beer and wine could be imported into the United States.355 
According to Jennifer Mascott, members of the First Congress 
believed that, at least with respect to duties on goods, legislative 
specificity helped ensure that the customs laws balanced conflicting 
                                                            
to the Treasury Secretary. Act of March 3, 17971, § 43, 1 Stat. 199, 209. And in the 1797 
debates over the Remission Act’s reauthorization, several members revived the proposal 
from 1790 for a multi-member board, rather than the Treasury Secretary alone. See 6 
ANNALS OF CONG. 2287 (Swanwick); id. (Coit); id. (Livingston).  
351 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2291 (Coit). 
352 See supra Part II.B-C. 
353 See, e.g., Wurman, supra note __, at 34-37. 
354 See Mascott, supra note __, at 1415-27. 
355 See, e.g., Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 27, § 12, 1 Stat. 259, 259 (prohibiting importation of 
beer, ale, or porter in casks smaller than forty gallons or in packages of fewer than six 
dozen bottles); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 44 
(2012) (1791 Spirits Act specified “everything from the brand of hydrometer to be used in 
testing proof to the exact lettering to be used on casks that have been inspected”). 
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state and regional economic concerns through the mechanism of 
representative politics.356  
At the same time, Congress left critical aspects of this 
regulatory regime largely to executive discretion357—including the 
Remission Act’s authority to effectively rewrite the statutory 
penalties for customs violations. In other words, legislative 
specificity and executive discretion were not constitutionally 
irreconcilable modes of governance. They were simply different 
tools the early Congress reached for in order to meet the immediate 
challenges at hand. 
B. Improvising Administration 
Congress’s early willingness to experiment with administrative 
regimes becomes even more evident when we look across the 
domains of federal authority. Consider the episode that 
nondelegationists cite as powerful evidence of a demanding 
Founding-era doctrine: the 1792 statute establishing the national 
postal system. During debate over the legislation, Theodore 
Sedgwick proposed giving the President complete discretion to 
designate the roads on which the mail would travel.358 Echoing 
themes that arose in the Remission Act debates, Sedgwick asserted 
that the President had better information about the subject than 
Congress, and his decisions would not be “biassed by local 
interests.” 359 The proposal’s opponents doubted both propositions: 
collectively, Congress knew more about local conditions,360 and 
granting authority to the President would give him a “dangerous 
power” he could use to his personal advantage.361  
Several opponents also asserted that such a delegation would 
be unconstitutional—a fact that nondelegationists cite as powerful 
                                                            
356 See Mascott, supra note __, at 1395. 
357 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 84 (Congress passed statutes governing 
customs enforcement procedures without “any meaningful guidance about the 
circumstances in which ships ought to be searched or the type of evidence that ought to 
make collectors think that fraud or smuggling was afoot”). 
358 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791) (Sedgwick) (post roads would be determined “by 
such route as the President of the United States shall, from time to time, cause to be 
established”) 
359 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791) (Sedgwick). 
360 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 233 (1791) (White) (“No individual could possess an equal 
share of information with th[e] House on the subject of the geography of the United 
States.”). 
361 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 235 (1791) (statement of Rep. Vining). 
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evidence of a robust Founding-era doctrine.362 And in the final 
version of the statute, Congress specified the post roads in 
excruciating detail. 363 Yet as scholars have pointed out,364 in the 
very same statute Congress gave the executive branch broad 
discretion to extend the post roads and to decide where post offices 
would be located.365  
The mystery here is why Congress rejected a grant of executive 
discretion as to one part of the postal system but embraced as to 
other parts. The Constitution gives Congress the power to establish 
“Post Offices” and “post Roads,” so a partial grant of discretion is 
textually unjustifiable.366 A better explanation is that apportioning 
decision-making authority in this manner was simply the best way 
to satisfy competing interests and concerns. Communities near 
designated post roads reaped significant economic advantages, so 
representatives in the House may have been eager to specify by 
statute that the roads would run in their districts.367 But members of 
Congress likely had less enthusiasm for making adjustments to the 
routes going forward, a task that—like addressing remission 
petitions—would require constant legislative attention.368 Congress 
therefore left it to the executive branch to “extend[]” the system as 
it saw fit.369 In the end, as with the customs regime, a balance of 
legislative specification and executive discretion may have best 
accommodated the various interests at play. 
                                                            
362 See Gordon, supra note __, at 744-47; Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note __, at 402-
03; POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY, supra note __, at 75-77 (2017); Wurman, supra note __, at 8-
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363 See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. 232, 232-33. 
364 See Chabot, supra note __, at 41; Mortenson & Bagley, supra note __, at 94-96; 
Wurman, supra note __, at 18-19. 
365 See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. 232, 233 (Postmaster General can enter into 
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P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period: 1789-1801, at 149 (1997) 
(“[O]ne is tempted to attribute the House’s zest for detail more to a taste for pork than to a 
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368 See MASHAW, supra note __, at 46 (Congress was concerned that it would be inundated 
with “demands for the expansion of the postal service”). 
369 See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. 232, 233.  
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Or take another example: the Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793. 
Within weeks of convening, the First Congress received petitions 
from inventors seeking private legislation confirming their 
intellectual property rights—as state legislatures had traditionally 
done.370 Apparently concerned about the volume of work involved, 
Congress immediately sought to allocate responsibility 
elsewhere.371 It considered a number of different arrangements, 
including juries and private referees.372 As commentators have 
noted, Congress ultimately gave authority to a panel of executive 
branch officers to grant patents to any invention they deemed 
“sufficiently useful or important.”373 Even nondelegationist scholars 
admit: This was a broad grant of discretion in an area of significant 
economic importance.374  
Congress revised the Act in 1793. Among other changes, 
executive officers no longer had the discretion to approve or deny a 
patent on “useful or important” grounds. Instead, the Secretary of 
State and Attorney General had no discretion; they were to grant a 
patent in response to any application that met the statute’s technical 
requirements.375 Rival inventors could then challenge issued patents 
in court on various grounds. This change left the judiciary, rather 
than the executive, as the institution ultimately responsible for 
determining which inventions would receive protection.376 
Contrary to what one nondelegationist asserts, Congress did not 
make this change out of concern that the 1790 Act unconstitutionally 
delegated legislative authority to the executive branch.377 As 
recalled twenty years later by Thomas Jefferson (the 1793 Act’s 
                                                            
370 See McKinley, supra note __, 1563-65. 
371 See id. at 1565. 
372 Chabot, supra note __, 36. 
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the courts of law.”). 
377 See Gordon, supra note __, 796-97. 
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prime mover378), the institutional rearrangement was a matter of 
efficiency. Under the 1790 Act, the executive board developed a few 
general rules in determining whether to grant patents, but an 
“abundance of cases” fell outside their scope.379 Deciding these 
cases took time—more than the cabinet officers could “spare from 
higher duties.”380 So the 1793 Act turned responsibility “over to the 
judiciary,” to allow the patent-granting process “to be matured into 
a system” that would enable inventors to know their rights.381  
Importantly, Jefferson did not think (at least in hindsight) that 
this was actually the best way to award patents. Judges’ educations 
left them ill-prepared to decide questions of scientific merit, and 
inventors would therefore find little guidance in “the lubberly 
volumes of the law.”382 Jefferson would have preferred leaving the 
matter to a board of “Academical professors” instead.383 But a 
proposal to create a separate department to handle patents was 
roundly opposed in Congress in 1793.384 And because England had 
adopted the judicial model, “the usual predominancy of her 
examples,” according to Jefferson, led to a similar arrangement in 
the United States.385 
The parallels between the Patent and Remission Acts are 
revealing. In both, Congress sought to divest itself of legislative 
authority to decide important questions of private right.386 It 
considered delegating its power to several different configurations 
of judicial and executive branch officials. It ultimately settled on an 
arrangement that offered administrative advantages, but was not 
inherently the right choice. Indeed, it may have largely been a 
reflexive retreat to familiar models derived from British practice. 
And all the while, few constitutional objections (if any) emerged. 
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These are just a few of many examples of Congress’s early 
experimentation in arranging institutional decision-making, many of 
which involved broad delegations of discretionary authority.387 It 
did the same with military pensions,388 the governance of federal 
territories,389 and management of the national debt.390 Indeed, as 
historians have recently demonstrated, this kind of administrative 
creativity extended across the many domains of federal governance, 
in areas as diverse as revenue collection,391 military development,392 
disaster relief,393 land sales,394 and public subsidies395 (among 
others).  
This improvisation—and uncertainty—extended not just to the 
allocation of powers, but also to the assignment of personnel. The 
early federal government was deeply understaffed,396 and the early 
Congress routinely sought to enlist various federal and state officers 
to fulfill multiple government functions397 (as did the executive 
branch398). At times these efforts prompted constitutional 
objections, but not on delegation grounds. Famously, in Hayburn’s 
Case the Justices of the Supreme Court raised constitutional doubts 
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about their role in deciding who was eligible for Revolutionary War 
pensions, because the statutory scheme effectively allowed 
Congress and the Secretary of War to overrule their decisions.399 In 
response, Congress created a new scheme in which judges only took 
evidence and transmitted it to the Secretary400—a role remarkably 
similar to the one Congress ultimately assigned to federal judges 
under the Remission Act.401 Even though assignment of these 
considerable administrative duties apparently rankled some judges, 
no constitutional complaints ever arose.402  
To be sure, the possibility that there was some original 
constitutional limit on Congress’s ability to delegate its powers is 
not preposterous. As this article (and others) have demonstrated, 
nondelegation arguments popped up occasionally in early legislative 
debates, and it seems unlikely that sophisticated skeptics of 
executive power (like James Madison), would bother with 
arguments that could not pass the laugh test. But whatever 
constitutional principle Madison and others had in mind, it clearly 
did not have much purchase. Across the federal government, 
Congress made decisions about where it should locate decision-
making authority not by reference to immovable principles of 
constitutional law, but through the rough and tumble of legislative 
politics.  
Indeed, according to Hamilton, that was the way it should be. 
When he first proposed that Congress vest its remission authority 
“somewhere,” Hamilton indicated that the legislature could 
“safe[l]y” delegate that power to another entity, but he did not 
specify to whom.403 A question of such “delicacy and importance,” 
according to Hamilton, would best be answered after “mature 
deliberation” by Congress.404 In the end, the choice of whether—
and where—to delegate legislative authority was left to the 
legislature itself. 
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CONCLUSION 
On its own, the Remission Act may not prove that a restrictive 
version of the nondelegation doctrine is historically unjustified. The 
Act is just one instance of early federal legislation granting the 
executive branch broad discretion to fashion rules governing private 
conduct. And it is an odd one, at that. The Treasury Secretary did 
not formally make prospective rules. He simply altered or dispensed 
with Congress’s statutory directives as he saw fit, even if he did so 
consistently and predictably. In so doing, the Secretary exercised 
discretion that was greater than—but not wholly distinct from—the 
law-enforcing authority we conventionally understand executive 
branch officials to enjoy. As the Remission Act’s chief 
congressional defender, Fisher Ames, suggested, perhaps remission 
as a form of constitutional authority was neither fish nor fowl.405 
And perhaps remission’s defiance of easy categorization is what 
made its delegation to the executive constitutionally palatable. 
If remission’s peculiarity may be a plausible explanation for the 
Act’s passage and persistence, it is not the best one. Even if couched 
in unusual form, the power Congress granted to the Treasury 
Secretary in 1790 was unmistakably broad and fundamentally 
legislative. That is likely why no one in Congress bothered to defend 
the Act’s constitutionality on the ground of exceptionality. Nor was 
the Act the only such delegation the early Congress made. As this 
article shows, it is similarly difficult to explain away other examples 
on the basis of distinctions no one at the Founding made, and likely 
would have rejected. If there was a Founding-era consensus that the 
Constitution incorporated some sort of nondelegation principle, 
apparently it did not meaningfully limit Congress’s ability to give 
away its power. 
The difficulty of pigeonholing remission highlights a broader 
point, as well. In this and many other areas, the early Congresses 
often showed little interest in articulating a careful taxonomy of 
offices and powers. When it came to designing an efficient and 
responsive administrative system of federal governance, the 
Founding generation did not traffic much in constitutional absolutes. 
That, of course, is a challenge for judges and scholars who seek to 
ground definitive statements of constitutional principle in historical 
evidence.406 If nothing else, it suggests that the search for a “useable 
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past” by those who advocate for a more stringent version of the 
nondelegation doctrine may be unproductive.407 
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